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I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The
sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every pe-
riod, can privately observe the realization of an i.i.d. state before communication takes place.
I characterize every type of sender’s highest equilibrium payoff. When the highest lying cost in
the support of the receivers’ prior belief approaches the sender’s benefit from lying, every type’s
highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated communication game converges to his equilibrium payoff
in a one-shot Bayesian persuasion game. I also show that in every sender-optimal equilibrium,
no type of sender mixes between telling the truth and lying at every history. When there exist
ethical types whose lying costs outweigh their benefits, I provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for all non-ethical type senders to attain their optimal commitment payoffs. I identify an outside
option effect through which the possibility of being ethical decreases every non-ethical type’s payoff.
Keywords: reputation, repeated game, lack of commitment, Bayesian persuasion, communication.
JEL Codes: C73, D82, D83
1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized that informed experts’ commitment power has significant effects
on communication outcomes. In the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982), an expert’s
temptation to mislead his audience undermines his credibility, which leads to ineffective information
transmission and low social welfare. When the expert can commit to disclosure policies, as in
the model of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), his messages can have more influence over others’
decisions, and his payoff improves relative to the benchmark scenario without commitment.
In practice, experts face credibility issues when committing to disclosure policies.1 This is
especially the case when an expert has private interests on his advisees’ decisions and his optimal
disclosure policy is stochastic. In these scenarios, it is against the expert’s own interest to honor
his commitment after receiving payoff-relevant private information.
∗Department of Economics, Northwestern University. I thank Drew Fudenberg, Piotr Dworczak, Yingni Guo,
Delong Meng, Wojciech Olszewski, Teck Yong Tan, Eran Shmaya, and Bruno Strulovici for helpful comments.
1Two exceptions to this statement include: the leading application of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), in which a
prosecutor is required by law to disclose everything he learns from investigations, as well as pharmaceutical companies
that are legally obliged to disclose the outcomes of drug trials to the FDA.
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A plausible microfoundation for the expert’s commitment is that he communicates with multiple
receivers one at a time, and each receiver observes the expert’s past recommendations and compare
them with past state realizations. However, according to the results of Fudenberg, Kreps and
Maskin (1990) and Fudenberg and Levine (1994), when the expert’s optimal disclosure policy is
nontrivially stochastic, his highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated game is strictly bounded
below his optimal commitment payoff no matter how patient he is. This is because receivers cannot
perfectly monitor the expert’s stochastic disclosure policies, and as a result, inefficient punishments
need to occur on the equilibrium path in order to provide the expert incentives.
I examine the extent to which a strategic expert can restore his commitment power in repeated
communication games when he has persistent private information about his psychological cost of
lying. In my model, a patient sender communicates with an infinite sequence of receivers, arriving
one in each period and each plays the game only in the period she arrives. The stage-game follows
from the leading example in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). In every period, the sender privately
observes the realization of an i.i.d. state, which is either high or low, and recommends either a high
action or a low action. The receiver chooses one of the two actions after observing the sender’s
recommendation together with the history of states and recommendations. The receiver wants to
match her action with the state. The sender strictly prefers the high action regardless of the state,
and suffers from a psychological cost of lying when his recommendation fails to match the state.
I assume each receiver strictly prefers the low action under her prior belief, and first focus on
settings in which the sender’s highest possible lying cost is strictly lower than his benefit from the
high action. The latter implies that all types of the sender are non-ethical, in the sense that they
have strict incentives to mislead a receiver who takes their messages at face value. This modeling
assumption contrasts to the commitment-type model of Mathevet, Pearce and Stacchetti (2019),
in which the sender can commit to disclosure policies with positive probability.
Theorem 1 characterizes every type of patient sender’s highest equilibrium payoff. To compute
this payoff, consider an auxiliary static optimization problem in which a planner chooses a distri-
bution over stage-game action profiles to maximize this type of sender’s expected payoff subject
to two constraints.2 First, the highest-cost type sender’s payoff under this distribution is no more
than his payoff under the full disclosure policy. Second, the receiver’s stage-game action best replies
against the conditional distribution over the sender’s stage-game actions.
2Each stage-game action for the sender is a mapping from the set of states to the set of messages. Each stage-game
action for the receiver is a mapping from the set of messages to the set of actions. A stage-game action profile consists
of a stage-game action for the sender and a stage-game action for the receiver.
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My characterization result has three implications. First, every type’s highest equilibrium payoff
depends only on his true cost of lying and the highest cost of lying in the support of receivers’ prior
belief. Second, for every type who does not have the highest cost, his highest equilibrium payoff is
strictly greater than his highest attainable payoff in a repeated game where his lying cost is common
knowledge. This is somewhat puzzling given that the sender needs to extract information rent (or
equivalently, reveal information about his persistent type) in order to obtain such high payoffs. As
the sender becomes more patient, the number of periods he needs to extract information rent to
attain a given discounted average payoff grows without bound. How can he reveal persistent private
information for unboundedly many times while preserving his informational advantage? Third,
as the highest lying cost in the support of receivers’ prior belief converges to the sender’s benefit
from lying, every type of sender’s highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated game converges to his
optimal commitment payoff in the one-shot game. This observation provides a strategic justification
for the sender’s commitment to disclosure policies in Bayesian persuasion models.
My second result clarifies the distinction between a strategic-type sender who faces high lying
cost and a commitment-type sender who uses his optimal disclosure policy in every period. Theorem
2 shows that whenever the sender has two or more types, in every sender-optimal equilibrium, no
type mixes between telling the truth and lying (i.e., recommending the high action in both states) at
all on-path histories. It then implies that no type adopts his optimal disclosure policy at every on-
path history in any equilibrium (no matter whether it is sender-optimal or not). These conclusions
extend to a type whose lying cost exactly offsets his benefit from the high action.
To understand why, suppose toward a contradiction that one type of sender mixes between the
two stage-game actions at every history. Then telling the truth at every history and lying at every
history are both his best replies. First, suppose this type is not the one with the highest lying
cost, then the highest-cost type tells the truth with probability one at every on-path history. As a
result, the second-highest-cost type will be separated from the highest-cost type as soon as he lies,
after which his cost becomes the highest in the support of receivers’ posterior belief. This implies
that his equilibrium payoff cannot exceed his payoff in the repeated complete information game,
which contradicts the second implication of Theorem 1 that the second-highest-cost type strictly
benefits from incomplete information. Second, suppose this type is the one with the highest lying
cost, then lying at every history is one of his equilibrium best replies, from which he obtains his
highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated incomplete information game. This suggests a lower
bound on the second-highest-cost type’s payoff by lying in every period, which one can verify that
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it is strictly greater than his highest equilibrium payoff. This leads to a contradiction.
My third result incorporates the possibility that the sender is ethical in the sense that his lying
cost outweighs his benefit from the high action. Theorem 3 provides a necessary and sufficient
condition for all non-ethical types to attain their optimal commitment payoffs. My condition
depends only on the highest and the lowest lying costs among the ethical types. Moreover, given the
existence of at least one ethical type, and fixing one of the aforementioned variables, this condition
is satisfied if and only if the other variable falls below a cutoff. This result suggests that a non-
ethical sender can be worse off when receivers entertain the possibility of an ethical-type with a
high lying cost. This contrasts to situations without ethical types in which every type of patient
sender’s highest equilibrium payoff strictly increases with the highest lying cost.
The above observation is driven by an outside option effect that is absent in models without
ethical types as well as reputation models with commitment types. When receivers entertain the
possibility of an ethical type with a high lying cost, the ethical types whose lying costs are relatively
low enjoy better outside options given that they can imitate the equilibrium strategy of this newly
introduced high-cost type. Such an improvement in outside options limits the frequency with
which each ethical type can lie, and as a result, reduces non-ethical types’ opportunities to lie while
pooling with at least some ethical types.
I construct equilibria that exhibit slow learning and reputation rebuilding to establish the at-
tainability of high payoffs in Theorems 1 and 3. Take Theorem 1 for example, in periods where
active learning takes place, all types of the sender mix between lying and telling the truth, with
the highest-cost type telling the truth with strictly higher probability. All other types lie with
probability one if and only if the receiver’s belief attaches probability close to 1 to the highest-cost
type. The highest-cost type’s mixing during the active learning phase allows each low-cost type to
rebuild his reputation after milking it. It also reduces his reputational loss each time he extracts
information rent, which enables him to benefit from his persistent private information in the long
run. To provide incentives for all types of senders to mix in the active learning phase, I construct
absorbing phases after which learning about the sender’s type stops. The sender’s action choices
in the active learning phase affect the time at which play reaches the absorbing phase, as well as
his continuation payoff after learning stops.
Related Literature: My paper is related to the literature on repeated communication games,
strategic communication games with lying costs, and repeated games with incomplete information.
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Repeated communication games are studied in the seminal works of Sobel (1985) and Benabou
and Laroque (1992). Best and Quigley (2017) and Mathevet, Pearce and Stacchetti (2019) use this
framework to rationalize the commitment assumption in Bayesian persuasion models.3
Mathevet, Pearce and Stacchetti (2019) adopt the commitment-type approach. They show
that a patient sender can attain his Bayesian persuasion payoff if with positive probability, he is
a commitment type who mechanically communicates according to his optimal disclosure policy at
every history. This differs from my baseline model in which all types of the sender are rational and
strictly prefer to mislead receivers. In terms of behavior, I show that no type of rational sender
communicates according to his optimal disclosure policy at every history.
Best and Quigley (2017) study repeated communication games without persistent types. They
propose a coin and cup mechanism that allows future receivers to perfectly monitor the sender’s
mixed actions, under which the patient sender can attain his optimal commitment payoff. In
particular, the sender has access to a private randomization device, the realization of which is
not observed by the current-period receiver, but is perfectly observed by the sender and will be
truthfully disclosed to all future receivers. However, the sender needs to have commitment power
since truthfully disclosing the realizations of this private randomization is against his own interest.
Compared to Best and Quigley (2017), my model focuses on situations in which the sender cannot
commit to act against his own interest, and consequently, the receivers cannot perfectly monitor
the sender’s mixed actions.
The fact that people face psychological costs of lying has been established experimentally by
Gneezy (2005) and Gneezy, Kajackaite and Sobel (2018). It has been incorporated in the strategic
communication models of Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) and Kartik (2009). Guo and
Shmaya (2019) and Nguyen and Tan (2019) study static communication games with lying costs in
which the sender receives private information according to a pre-committed information structure
before communicating with an uninformed receiver. Their models nest Bayesian persuasion games
of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), cheap talk games of Crawford and Sobel (1982), and communi-
cation games with information design in Ivanov (2010).4 Their results provide a microfoundation
3Kuvalekar, Lipnowski and Ramos (2019) study repeated communication games in which receivers cannot observe
the state realizations in the past. They show the equivalence between repeated communication games without
feedback and one-shot communication games with capped money burning. Renault, Solan and Vieille (2013) and
Margaria and Smolin (2018) focus on cases in which both players are patient. In those models, the sender can be
punished by transferring payoffs to a patient receiver. This is not feasible in my model since receivers are myopic.
Meng (2018) studies repeated communication games in which the receiver is patient and can commit. His result
bounds the receiver’s payoff from below when the sender has persistent private information about his preference.
4Another approach to bridge the gap between cheap talk games and Bayesian persuasion games is proposed by
Lipnowski, Ravid and Shishkin (2019), who study static communication games in which the sender has transparent
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for the sender’s commitment to disclosure policies when his lying cost is sufficiently large.
Those features contrast to my model in which the sender automatically observes the state, in
the sense that he cannot commit to receive coarser information. My results suggest that non-
ethical senders can attain their commitment payoffs only when the highest lying cost belongs to
some interval, not when the latter is large enough. Different from Guo and Shmaya (2019), the
possibility of having a high cost of lying may hurt a non-ethical sender through an outside option
effect. In addition, the attainability of the sender’s optimal commitment payoff relies on his ability
to extract information rent in the long run, rather than relying entirely on the cost of lying.
My paper contributes to the study of repeated incomplete information games pioneered by
Aumann and Maschler (1995) and Hart (1985). Shalev (1994) characterizes the set of equilibrium
payoffs in private-value games with one-sided private information and no discounting. Pe¸ski (2014)
extends Shalev’s characterization to repeated games with discounting and allows for two-sided
private information. When the informed player is patient and the uninformed player’s discount
factor is bounded away from one, Cripps and Thomas (2003) show that Shalev’s result provides a
necessary condition for being an equilibrium payoff, but it is not sufficient in general.
I provide conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for a patient sender’s equilibrium
payoff in a repeated communication game where receivers are impatient. My results are robust to
perturbations of the receiver’s discount factor. I also examine the common properties of the sender’s
behavior that uniformly apply across all sender-optimal equilibria. This raises novel questions
provided that the existing literature on repeated games focuses mostly on equilibrium payoffs.
2 Model
Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, .... A long-lived sender with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1)
interacts with an infinite sequence of receivers, arriving one in each period and each plays the game
only in the period she arrives.5
In period t, the realization of ωt ∈ Ω ≡ {h, l} is privately observed by the sender. The states
{ωt}t∈N are i.i.d., with ph ∈ (0, 1/2) the probability of ωt = h and the value of ph being commonly
known. The sender sends message mt ∈ M ≡ {h, l} to the period t receiver. The latter takes an
action at ∈ A ≡ {H,L} after observing mt and the public history ht ≡ {as, ωs,ms}t−1s=0 ∈ Ht.
motives, and can commit to disclosure policies with positive probability.
5My results are robust to perturbations of the receiver’s discount factor. For example, when the sender commu-
nicates with one long-lived receiver whose discount factor is strictly positive but close to zero.
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The receiver’s payoff is normalized to 0 if at = L, her payoff is 1 if at = H and ωt = h, and her
payoff is −1 if at = H and ωt = l. The sender’s stage-game payoff is:
us(c, at,mt, ωt) = 1{at = h} − c1{mt 6= ωt}, (2.1)
where c ∈ C ≡ {c1, c2, ..., cn} ⊂ [0, 1) is interpreted as his psychological cost of lying, and is incurred
whenever the literal meaning of his message does not match the realized state. Without loss of
generality, I assume that 0 ≤ cn < cn−1 < ...c2 < c1 < 1. In section 5, I relax the assumption
that all types of the sender’s lying cost are strictly less than 1, and examine how the possibility of
ethical-type senders affects non-ethical-type sender’s equilibrium payoffs.
I assume that c is perfectly persistent and is the sender’s private information (or his type). The
receivers entertain a full support prior belief pi ≡ (pi1, ..., pin), with pij the probability of type cj .
The distributions of c and {ωt}t∈N are independent. Under the assumption that c1 < 1, all types
of the sender are non-ethical in the sense that they have strict incentives to recommend the high
action irrespective of the state when facing a receiver who takes messages at their face values.
Let H ≡ ∪∞t=0Ht be the set of public histories. The receiver’s strategy is σr : H×M → ∆(A).
Type c sender’s strategy is σc : H × Ω → ∆(M). A strategy profile is σ ≡
(
(σc)c∈C , σr
)
, which
consists of a strategy for every type of the sender and a strategy for the receivers.
A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) is a strategy profile such that σr maximizes each receiver’s
expected stage-game payoff at every ht that occurs with positive probability under σ, and σc
maximizes type c sender’s discounted average payoff, given by:
E
(σc,σr)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtus(c, at,mt, ωt)
]
, (2.2)
where E(σc,σr)[·] is the expectation under the probability measure induced by (σc, σr).
A sequential equilibrium consists of a strategy profile σ ≡ ((σc)c∈C , σr) and an assessment µ
such that (1) σr maximizes the receiver’s stage-game payoff at every history according to µ, (2)
for every c ∈ C and at every information set of type c sender, σc maximizes his discounted average
payoff in the continuation game against σr, and (3) there exists a sequence of completely mixed
strategy profiles {σn}n∈N and a sequence of assessments {µn}n∈N such that for every n ∈ N, µn is
derived from σn according to Bayes Rule, and (σn,µn)→ (σ,µ) in the product topology.
3 RESULTS 8
Remark: The sender’s stage-game payoff in (2.1) embodies the non-consequentialism view on
lying, which postulates that the sender incurs a cost of lying whenever the literal meaning of his
message fails to match the true state. This includes situations in which his lie has caused no harm
to the receivers, for example, when the receiver’s action is independent of his message. This view
on lying is supported by the writings of Immanuel Kant and the recent work of Sobel (2020).6 It is
adopted in the game theoretic models of Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) and Kartik (2009).
In Appendix D, I extend my analysis to the consequentialism view of lying, that a lying cost is
incurred only when it has caused negative payoff consequences to the receiver (e.g., receiver takes
the message at face value).7 My main takeaways remain valid under this alternative view.
3 Results
3.1 Highest Equilibrium Payoff
The sender’s payoff is an n-dimensional vector v = (v1, v2, ..., vn) ∈ Rn, where vj is the discounted
average payoff of type cj . Let v
∗ ≡ (v∗1 , ..., v∗n), with
v∗j ≡ ph
{
1 +
c1 − cj
2ph + c1(1− 2ph)
}
. (3.1)
Theorem 1 characterizes every type of patient sender’s highest equilibrium payoff, and claims that
the highest equilibrium payoffs for all types can be attained in the same equilibrium:
Theorem 1. There is no BNE such that type c1 attains payoff strictly more than v
∗
1. For every
ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ > δ:
1. There is no BNE such that type cj attains payoff more than v
∗
j + ε for some j ∈ {2, 3, ..., n}.
2. There exists a sequential equilibrium in which the sender attains payoff within ε of v∗.
Theorem 1 suggests that v∗j is type cj patient sender’s highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated
communication game. The two statements use different solution concepts to ensure that first,
the payoff upper bounds in statement 1 apply under weak solution concepts, i.e., it applies to a
6Kant wrote in his influential article On the Supposed Right to Lie From Benevolent Motives that To be truthful
(honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any
expediency. Sobel (2020) wrote that Lying depends on the existence of accepted meanings for messages, but does not
require a model of how the audience responds to messages.
7Martin Luther wrote ...a lie out of necessity, a useful lie, a helpful lie, such lies would not be against God, he would
accept them. Gneezy (2005) shows experimentally that holding the sender’s benefit from lying fixed, the propensity
to lie decreases when the receiver becomes more credulous, or when the receiver’s loss from the sender’s lie increases.
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broader set of outcomes. Second, the equilibria that approximately attain v∗ survive demanding
refinements such as sequential equilibrium. Therefore, they are not driven by unreasonable beliefs
off the equilibrium path.
The formula for type cj ’s highest equilibrium payoff has three implications. First, every type of
sender’s highest equilibrium payoff depends only on the receiver’s prior belief about the i.i.d. state,
his own cost of lying cj , and the highest lying cost in the support of the receivers’ prior belief c1.
It does not depend on the other types in the support of pi and the probability of each type.
Second, the type that has the highest lying cost cannot receive payoff that is strictly greater
than ph. According to Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990) and Fudenberg and Levine (1994),
ph is every type of sender’s highest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game where his lying cost is
common knowledge. Intuitively, this is because type c1 is the most ethical type, and as a result, he
has no good candidate to imitate in the repeated game with persistent private information.
Third, v∗j > ph for every j ≥ 2. In another word, every type of sender except for type c1 strictly
benefits from persistent private information. This is somewhat puzzling since a type of sender
obtaining discounted average payoff strictly greater than ph requires this type to extract information
rent, i.e., lying while receiving a receiver’s trust. Each receiver’s myopic incentive requires this type
of sender to behave differently from the other types, and as a result, extracting information rent
reveals information about the sender’s lying cost to future receivers and undermines the sender’s
informational advantage. As δ → 1, the number of periods in which the sender needs to extract
information rent (to attain a given discounted average payoff) grows without bound. This raises
a paradox that the sender can reveal information about his persistent type for unbounded number
of periods while preserving his informational advantage in order to extract information rent in the
future. I explain how to construct equilibrium to resolve this conceptual puzzle in section 4.4, with
technical details relegated to Appendix A.
Finally, when the highest lying cost c1 converges to 1, v
∗
j converges to
v∗∗j ≡ ph + ph(1− cj), for every j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, (3.2)
where v∗∗j is type cj sender’s payoff in a static Bayesian persuasion game taking his psychological
cost of lying into account. Intuitively, when the sender can commit to communication rule α : Ω→
∆(M), his optimal commitment requires him to send message h with probability 1 when the state
is h, and to send message h with probability ph1−ph when the state is l. This disclosure policy makes
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the receiver indifferent between actions H and L upon receiving message h.
The above implication of Theorem 1 provides a microfoundation for the sender’s commitment
to information structures in Bayesian persuasion models. In environments where all types of the
sender are rational and have strict incentives to mislead receivers, as long as there exists one type
of the sender whose lying cost is close to his benefit from the receiver’s high action, all types can
(approximately) attain their optimal commitment payoffs in a repeated communication game.
Compared to commitment-type models which assume that with positive probability, the sender
is a commitment type that adopts his optimal information disclosure policy in every period, my
approach addresses critiques on commitment-type senders who mechanically communicate accord-
ing to some stochastic disclosure policies in every period, given that whether such commitment
behaviors can arise from maximizing reasonable payoff functions is somewhat questionable.
Theorem 1 also characterizes the extent to which the sender’s commitment power can be partially
restored via persistent private information when he repeatedly communicates with multiple receivers
over time. My result provides a tractable formula for every type’s highest equilibrium payoff,
which is between his highest payoff in the repeated complete information game and his payoff in
the one-shot Bayesian persuasion game. My formula depends only on primitives that have clear
economic interpretations and clarifies the role of persistent private information. It bridges the gap
between existing results on repeated complete information games, Bayesian persuasion games, and
reputation games with commitment types.
3.2 Equilibrium Behavior
My next result clarifies the distinction between a strategic-type sender who faces high lying cost
and a commitment-type who mechanically uses his optimal disclosure policy at every history.
Let a : Ω → M be a pure stage-game action for a given type of sender, and let b : M → A be
a pure stage-game action for a receiver. Let A and B be the sets of a and b, respectively. Let aH
be the honest strategy and let aL be the lying strategy for the sender:
aH(ω) ≡

 h if ω = hl if ω = l, aL(ω) ≡

 h if ω = hh if ω = l. (3.3)
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Let bT be the trusting strategy and let bN be the non-trusting strategy for the receiver:
bT (m) ≡

 H if m = hL if m = l, bN (m) ≡

 L if m = hL if m = l. (3.4)
Abusing notation, let σcj : H → ∆(A) be type cj sender’s strategy, and let σr : H → ∆(B) be
the receiver’s strategy. My next result shows that in every sender-optimal equilibrium, no type of
the sender mixes between aH and aL at all on-path histories.
Theorem 2. Suppose n ≥ 2. For every small enough ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
when δ > δ, for every BNE in which the sender attains payoff greater than (v∗1 − ε, ..., v∗n − ε), no
type of the sender plays both aH and aL with positive probability at all on-path histories.
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose toward a contradiction that there exists a type cj that plays both
aH and aL with positive probability at every on-path history. Then playing aH at every on-path
history and playing aL at every on-path history are both his best replies against σr. This further
implies that for every i < j, type ci plays a
H with probability 1 at every on-path history.8 The
above statement uses the observation that the sender’s benefit from changing his stage-game action
is a separable function with respect to his type and the receiver’s stage-game action.
I consider two cases separately. First, if j ≥ 2, then type c1 plays aH with probability 1 at
every on-path history. Therefore, type c2 separates from type c1 the first time he sends message h
in state l, after which he becomes the highest-cost type in the support of the receivers’ posterior
belief. According to Proposition 1, his continuation value is no more than ph. As a result, type
c2’s expected payoff in period 0 is no more than (1 − δ) + δph, which is strictly lower than v∗2 as
δ → 1. This contradicts the presumption that type c2’s equilibrium payoff exceeds v∗2 − ε.
Second, if j = 1, then type c1 finds it optimal to play a
L in every period. Since the sender’s
equilibrium payoff is within ε of v∗, type c1’s payoff is at least v∗1− ε by playing aL in every period,
and type c2’s payoff from doing so is no more than v
∗
2+ε. Since ph < 1/2, the receiver’s stage-game
action of playing H following every message is strictly suboptimal, and cannot be played at any
on-path history. Among the remaining three receiver stage-game actions, the sender’s stage-game
8Different from the binary action game in Pei (2019), it is not true that for every k < j, type ck plays a
L with
probability 1 at every on-path history. This is because the sender has other stage-game actions, such as lying in both
states, from which case he suffers strictly higher lying cost compared to playing aL.
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payoff is 1− (1− ph)c under (aL,bT ), is −(1− ph)c under (aL,bN ) and (aL,bO), where
bO(m) ≡

 H if m = lL if m = h.
Let QL be the occupation measure of (a
L,bT ) when the sender plays aL in every period and the
receiver plays according to σr. Type c1’s equilibrium payoff is:
QL
(
1− (1− ph)c1
)
− (1−QL)(1− ph)c1.
The presumption that type c1’s equilibrium payoff is more than ph− ε yields a lower bound on QL,
which is:
QL ≥ ph + (1− ph)c1 − ε. (3.5)
Type c2’s payoff by playing a
L in every period is QL
(
1− (1−ph)c2
)− (1−QL)(1−ph)c2. Plugging
in (3.5), one can obtain that type c2’s equilibrium payoff is at least:
ph + (1− ph)(c1 − c2)− ε (3.6)
Given that ph < 1/2, the lower bound on type c2’s equilibrium payoff (3.6) is strictly greater than
v∗2+ε when ε is small enough. This contradicts statement 1 of Theorem 1 that type c2’s equilibrium
payoff when δ is large enough cannot exceed v∗2 + ε.
Since the sender’s optimal disclosure policy in a static Bayesian persuasion game is to play aL
with probability ρ∗ ≡ ph1−ph , and aH with probability 1 − ρ∗, a direct implication of Theorem 2 is
that no matter how large the sender’s lying cost is, there exists no BNE in which he communicates
according to his optimal disclosure policy at all on-path histories.
Formally, I call α ∈ ∆(A) an ε-optimal disclosure policy if bT is a strict best reply against α,
and α belongs to an ε-neighborhood of ρ∗aL + (1− ρ∗)aH .9
Corollary 1. For every small enough ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ > δ, in
every BNE, no type of the sender plays an ε-optimal disclosure policy at every on-path history.
Corollary 1 applies to any number of types. Its conclusion contrasts to the commitment-type
9ρ∗aL + (1 − ρ∗)aH is not an ε-optimal disclosure policy since it violates the first requirement. This is because
according to Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and Gossner (2011), a long-run player’s guaranteed equilibrium payoff is
his payoff from playing his commitment action and his opponents play the best response that minimizes his payoff.
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sender in Mathevet, Pearce and Stacchetti (2019) who mechanically communicates according to his
optimal disclosure policy at every on-path history.
Proof of Corollary 1: First, consider the case in which n = 1. If the sender uses an ε-optimal
disclosure policy at every on-path history, then by definition, the receiver has a strict incentive to
play bT at every on-path history. By playing aL in every period, the sender obtains discounted
average payoff p+ (1− p)c, which is strictly greater than p and leads to a contradiction.
Next, consider the case in which n ≥ 2. Suppose toward a contradiction that there exists a type
ck ∈ C who plays an ε-optimal disclosure policy at every on-path history in equilibrium. Given
that the public history can statistically identify the sender’s stage-game action a ∈ A, the results in
Fudenberg and Levine (1992) and Gossner (2011) imply that for every j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, type cj can
guarantee payoff approximately v∗∗j by playing the equilibrium strategy of type ck. By definition,
v∗∗j > v
∗
j − ε for every j. This contradicts the conclusion of Theorem 2, since every ε-optimal
disclosure policy attaches positive probabilities to aH and aL, and the sender’s equilibrium payoff
strictly exceeds (v∗1 − ε, ..., v∗n − ε) when δ is large enough.
My proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 suggest that both conclusions extend to a type of
sender whose cost of lying exactly offsets his benefit from the receiver’s high action, i.e., c1 = 1.
Intuitively, this is because a strategic-type sender who has lying cost 1 strictly benefits from the
receiver’s high action, which differs from a commitment type who does not care about payoffs. As
a result, the strategic-type sender’s indifference between aH and aL at a given history ht introduces
constraints on the receiver’s strategies in the continuation game. This in turn leads to constraints
on other types of senders’ incentives and payoffs.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
In section 4.1, I construct a constrained optimization problem with v∗j equals its optimal value.
Then I map the outcomes of the repeated communication game to this constrained optimization
problem, according to which the objective function coincides with type cj sender’s discounted
average payoff. In sections 4.2 and 4.3, I show that the constraints in the optimization problem are
necessary for any equilibrium outcome of the repeated game. In section 4.4, I construct sequential
equilibrium in which the patient sender approximately attains payoff v∗.
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4.1 Payoff Upper Bound: v∗j as a Constrained Optimization Problem
Recall the definitions of pure stage-game actions for the sender and the receiver. Let us(c,a,b)
and ur(a,b) be the sender’s and the receiver’s stage-game payoff functions, respectively. Both are
naturally extended to mixed actions. Lemma 4.1 relates v∗j to a constrained optimization problem
defined via the stage game:
Lemma 4.1. For given j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, the value of the following constrained optimization
problem is v∗j :
max
γ∈∆(A×B)
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ(a,b)us(cj ,a,b), (4.1)
subject to: ∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ(a,b)us(c1,a,b) ≤ ph, (4.2)
and for every b ∈ B that the marginal distribution of γ on B attaches positive probability to,
b ∈ argmax
b′∈B
ur(γ(·|b),b′), (4.3)
where γ(·|b) ∈ ∆(A) is the distribution conditional on the receiver’s stage-game action being b.
Let
ρ∗ ≡ ph
1− ph , (4.4)
and recall the definitions of aH , aL, bT , and bN in (3.3) and (3.4), respectively. The following
distribution over stage-game action profiles, denoted by γ∗, attains the optimal value, with:
γ∗(aL,bN ) =
ρ∗(1− c1)
ρ∗(1− c1) + c1 ,
γ∗(aL,bT ) =
ρ∗c1
ρ∗(1− c1) + c1 ,
and
γ∗(aH ,bT ) =
(1− ρ∗)c1
ρ∗(1− c1) + c1 .
Players’ stage-game payoffs under these stage-game action profiles are given by:
− bT bN
aH ph, ph 0, 0
aL ph + (1− c)(1 − ph), 2ph − 1 −c(1− ph), 0
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Payoff of Type c1
Payoff of Type c2
(aH ,bT )
(aL,bT )
(aH ,bN )
(aL,bN )
(v∗1 , v
∗
2)
Figure 1: The sender’s highest equilibrium payoff vector (v∗1 , v
∗
2) when there are two types. The
two red lines capture the two constraints, and the intersection between them is v∗.
and a graphical illustration of the two constraints as well as v∗j can be found in Figure 1.
Next, I relate this constrained optimization problem to outcomes in the repeated communication
game. Recall that σc : H → ∆(A) is type c sender’s strategy, and σr : H → ∆(B) is the receiver’s
strategy. For any given strategy profile σ ≡ ((σc)c∈C , σr), let
γj(a,b) ≡ E(σcj ,σr)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{(at,bt) = (a,b)}
]
, for every (a,b) ∈ A×B. (4.5)
This defines a distribution over stage-game action profiles, denoted by γj ∈ ∆(A × B). By con-
struction, type cj sender’s discounted average payoff in the repeated game under strategy profile σ
equals his expected stage-game payoff under distribution γj , which is the objective function (4.1)
once replacing γ with γj . Therefore, as long as γj satisfies constraints (4.2) and (4.3), type cj
sender’s discounted average payoff in the repeated game under strategy profile σ cannot exceed v∗j .
4.2 Necessity of Constraint (4.2)
The necessity of constraint (4.2) is implied by type c1’s equilibrium payoff being no more than ph.
This is because the left-hand-side of (4.2) is type c1’s payoff by deviating type cj ’s equilibrium
strategy σcj . The latter cannot exceed ph if type c1’s equilibrium payoff is at most ph.
Proposition 1. For every Bayesian Nash Equilibrium σ and for every ht that occurs with
positive probability under σ, if ci is the highest-cost type in the support of the receiver’s belief at h
t,
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then type ci’s continuation payoff at h
t is at most ph.
A caveat is that even when there is only one type in the support of receivers’ belief, the conclusion
of Proposition 1 does not follow from the folk theorem results in Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin
(1990) and Fudenberg and Levine (1994). This is because a type that occurs with zero probability
at a given history is not equivalent to a type that is excluded from the type space. In particular,
zero probability types may occur with strictly positive probability at some future off-path histories.
This will in turn affect players’ incentives and payoffs at on-path histories.10
Proof of Proposition 1: Let C(ht) be the support of the receiver’s posterior belief after observing
ht but before observing mt. I show Proposition 1 by induction on |C(ht)|, namely, the number of
types in the support of the receiver’s belief. My proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: Suppose |C(ht)| = 1, then C(hs) = C(ht) for every hs such that hs ≻ ht and hs occurs
with positive probability under σ. Let ci be the only type in C(h
t). Strategy σ˜ci : H×Ω→ ∆(M)
defined below also best replies against the receiver’s equilibrium strategy σr:
σ˜ci(h
s)(ω) ≡

 m if σci(h
s)(ω) attaches positive probability to m and σr(h
s)(m) = L
σci(h
t)(ω) otherwise.
(4.6)
If both messages induce action L for sure and both messages are sent with positive probability by
σci at an information set, then pick any message for the sender.
By definition, type ci’s payoff under (σ˜ci , σr) equals his continuation payoff at h
t. If type θi
plays according to σ˜θi against σ2, then his expected payoff at every on-path history following h
t
cannot exceed ph. Therefore, type ci’s discounted average payoff at h
t cannot exceed ph.
Step 2: I show that if the conclusion holds for histories where |C(ht)| ≤ k, then it also holds for
histories where |C(ht)| = k + 1.
Let Hσ be the set of public histories that occur with positive probability under σ. Let ci be the
type that has the highest lying cost in C(ht). Given type ci’s equilibrium strategy σci , and recall
the definition of σ˜ci in (4.6), which is one of type ci’s best replies against the receiver’s equilibrium
10Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) present an example in which types that are included in the type space but occur
with zero prior probability are different from types that are excluded from the type space. They introduce a refinement
called “never dissuaded once convinced” to rule out such differences in outcomes. Madrigal, Tan and Werlang (1987)
construct a finite extensive form game in which there exists no equilibrium that satisfies the requirement “the support
of beliefs at an information set be contained in the supports of beliefs at preceding information sets”.
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strategy σr. Let H(σ˜ci ,σr) be the set of histories that occur with positive probability under (σ˜ci , σr),
which I partition into two subsets:
1. Outcome (ω = l, a = H) has never occurred before.
2. Outcome (ω = l, a = H) has occurred before.
Suppose type ci sender plays according to σ˜ci , at every history h
t that belongs to the first subset,
he has never received positive stage-game payoff when ωs = l. At every history h
t that belongs to
the second subset, but its immediate predecessor ht−1 belongs to the first subset, according to the
definition of σ˜ci ,
• there exists a message that induces action H with positive probability at ht−1,
• type ci sends that message at ht−1 with probability 1.
The receiver’s incentive to play H after receiving the aforementioned message at ht−1 implies the
existence of type cj ∈ C(ht−1) with cj 6= ci that sends the other message, denoted by m′, with
positive probability when ωt−1 = l at ht−1. Since ci is the type with the highest lying cost in set
C(ht−1), we have cj < ci. Moreover, at history (ht−1, (l,m′, L)), type θi occurs with probability
0, so |C(ht−1, (l,m′, L))| ≤ |C(ht−1)| − 1. According to the induction hypothesis, there exists
cτ ∈ C(ht−1, (l,m′, L)) such that type cτ ’s continuation payoff at (ht−1, (l,m′, L)) is no more than
ph. Given type cτ ’s incentive to send message l at h
t−1 when ωt = l, we have:
δph ≥ δVcτ (ht−1, (l,m′, L)) ≥ (1− δ)
(
Pr(at−1 = H|ht−1,mt−1 6= m′)− cτ
)
+δ Pr(at−1 = H|ht−1,mt−1 6= m′)Vcτ (ht−1, (l, h,H))+δ Pr(at−1 = L|ht−1,mt−1 6= m′)Vcτ (ht−1, (l, h, L)).
Since type cτ ’s stage-game payoff is no less than type ci’s stage-game payoff at every history, type
ci’s continuation payoff by not sending message m
′ when ωt−1 = l at history ht−1 is no more than
δph. Combining the conclusions at the two subsets of histories, we know that type ci’s continuation
payoff is no more than ph at every h
t with |C(ht)| ≤ k + 1.
Since the number of types is finite, the above induction argument implies that at every on-
path history ht, the highest-cost type in the support of the receivers’ posterior belief at ht receives
continuation payoff no more than ph.
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4.3 Necessity of Constraint (4.3)
I establish the necessity of (4.3) in two steps. Proposition 2 shows that γj satisfies an ε-relaxed
version of constraint (4.3) when δ is above some cutoff. Proposition 3 shows that the value of the
ε-constrained program converges to the value of the original program as ε vanishes to 0.
Proposition 2. For every ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ > δ, for every
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and every j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, if γj attaches probability more than ε to b,
then b is an ε-best reply against γj(·|b).
Proof of Proposition 2: For every hτ ∈ Hσ, let σcj(hτ ) ∈ ∆(A) be the distribution over stage-game
pure actions prescribed by σcj at h
τ , and let α(hτ ) ∈ ∆(A) be the receiver’s belief about the
sender’s stage-game pure actions at hτ . Since future receivers can perfectly observe the past state
realizations and the sender’s messages, the public signals can statistically identify the sender’s pure
stage-game action a ∈ A, Gossner (2011)’s result provides an upper bound on the expected sum of
the receivers’ one-step ahead prediction errors, measured by the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL
divergence for short) between σcj(h
τ ) and α(hτ ):
E
(σcj ,σr)
[ +∞∑
τ=0
d(σcj (h
τ )||α(hτ ))
]
≤ −λ log pij, (4.7)
where d(·||·) is the KL-divergence, pij is the prior probability of type cj , and λ > 0 is a constant.
Inequality (4.7) implies that for every ξ > 0, the expected number of periods such that
d(σcj (h
τ )||α(hτ )) > ξ is no more than
T (ξ) ≡
⌈
λ
− log pij
ξ
⌉
. (4.8)
Let σr(h
τ ) ∈ ∆(B) be the distribution over receiver’s pure stage-game action prescribed by σr at
hτ . Let Bσr (hτ ) be the support of σr(h
τ ). Since the receiver plays a stage-game best reply against
her expectation over the sender’s stage-game action, we have:
E
(σcj ,σr)
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(1− δ)δτ1
{
b ∈ Bσr (hτ ) but b does not best reply to any α with ||α− σcj(hτ )|| ≤
√
2ξ
}]
≤ E(σcj ,σr)
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(1− δ)δτ1
{
b ∈ Bσr (hτ ) but b does not best reply to any α with d(σcj (hτ )||α) ≤ ξ
}]
≤ E(σcj ,σr)
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(1− δ)δτ1
{
d(σcj (h
τ )||α(hτ )) > ξ
}]
≤ 1− δT (ξ). (4.9)
4 PROOF OF THEOREM 1 19
The first inequality comes from the Pinsker’s inequality, the second inequality holds since b best
replies against α(hτ ), and the third inequality comes from (4.7) and (4.8).
Recall the definition of γj ∈ ∆(A×B). Let βj be the marginal distribution of γj on B, and let
γj(·|b) be the distribution over A conditional on b under joint distribution γj . Let A(b) ⊂ ∆(A)
be the set of sender’s mixed stage-game actions that b best replies against. Consider any b ∈ B
with the property that the Hausdorff distance between γj(·|b) and set A(b) is more than ε. I denote
this distance by D. For every η > 0, let Aη(b) be the set of elements in ∆(A) whose Hausdorff
distance to A(b) is no more than η. Since the Hausdorff distance between any two points in ∆(A)
is at most 1, for any distribution over the sender’s mixed stage-game actions ρ ∈ ∆(∆(A)) that
has countable support {αi}i∈N, and satisfies:
∑
i∈N ρ(α
i
1)α
i = αj(·|b), we have:
∑
αi /∈Aη(b)
ρ(αi) ≥ D − η
1 +D − η . (4.10)
Therefore:
E
(σcj ,σr)
[ ∞∑
τ=0
(1− δ)δτ1
{
b ∈ Bσr (hτ ) but b does not best reply to any α with ||α− σcj(hτ )|| ≤ η
}]
≥ β
j(b)(D − η)
1 +D − η . (4.11)
Pick η ≡ D2 and ξ ≡ D
2
8 , we have
√
2ξ = D2 . Therefore, (4.9) and (4.11) together imply that for
every strategy profile that is an equilibrium under discount factor δ, we have:
βj(b) ≤
(
1− δT (D
2
8
)
)1 +D/2
D/2
. (4.12)
Since D ≥ ε, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that the RHS of (4.12) is less than ε for every δ ∈ (δ, 1).
That is to say, for every b ∈ B such that b is not an ε-best reply against γj(·|b), the marginal
distribution βj attaches probability less than ε to b.
Let vεj be the value of the optimization problem when the objective function is (4.1), subject to
constraint (4.2) and the ε-relaxed version of constraint (4.3). vεj converges to v
∗
j as ε→ 0.
Proposition 3. limε↓0 vεj = v
∗
j for every j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Proof of Proposition 3: Since the constraint in Proposition 2 relaxes constraint (4.3), we have vεj ≥
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v∗j , which implies that:
lim inf
ε↓0
vεj ≥ v∗j . (4.13)
The rest of the proof establishes the following inequality:
lim sup
ε↓0
vεj ≤ v∗j , (4.14)
The challenge is that the subset of ∆(A×B) that satisfies the ε-relaxed constraint is not convex.
My proof constructs a distribution γ ∈ ∆(A × B) that respects constraints (4.2) and (4.3), and
furthermore, is ε-close to a joint distribution that solves the ε-relaxed problem in Proposition 2.
This implies that type cj sender’s expected payoff is close under the two distributions.
Let Γε be the set of γ ∈ ∆(A × B) that satisfies constraint (4.2) and the ε-relaxed version of
constraint (4.3). Let Γ be the set of γ ∈ ∆(A×B) that satisfies constraints (4.2) and (4.3). I show
that for every η > 0, there exists ε > 0, such that for every γε ∈ Γε, there exists γ ∈ Γ that is
within η away from γε. This implies inequality (4.14).
First, for every b ∈ B, there exists a nondegenerate subset of ∆(A) such that b best replies
against. Since the number of pure stage-game actions is finite, for every η > 0, there exists ε > 0,
such that for every α ∈ ∆(A) and b ∈ B satisfying b is an ε-best reply against α, there exists
α′ ∈ ∆(A) within η away from α such that b best replies against α′.
Second, for every γε ∈ Γε, let
B∗ ≡ {b ∈ B∣∣ b best replies against γε(·|b)}.
By definition, the marginal distribution of γε on B, denoted by βε, attaches probability at most ε
to every b /∈ B∗. Consider the following modified distribution γ′ ∈ ∆(A×B):
1. For every b ∈ B∗, there exists γ∗ that is η away from γε(·|b), with b best replies to γ∗(·|b).
2. The marginal distribution of γ′ on B attaches probability β
ε(b)
βε(B∗) to b, and the distribution
over a conditional on b is γ∗(·|b).
Since ∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γε(a,b)us(c1,a,b) ≤ ph,
and βε attaches probability less than ε to every b /∈ B∗, there exists X : [0, 1] → N with
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limη→0X(η) = 0 such that
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ′(a,b)us(c1,a,b) ≤ ph +X(η) (4.15)
and
v∗j +X(η) ≥
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ′(a,b)us(cj ,a,b) +X(η) ≥
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γε(a,b)us(cj ,a,b) = v
ε
j . (4.16)
Consider two cases,
1. If
∑
(a,b)∈A×B γ
′(a,b)us(c1,a,b) ≤ ph, then γ′ satisfies constraints (4.2) and (4.3), and at-
tains payoff within X(η) of vεj .
2. If
∑
(a,b)∈A×B γ
′(a,b)us(c1,a,b) > ph, then let γ′′ ∈ ∆(A× B) be a convex combination of
γ′ and the Dirac measure on (aL,bN ), with the convex weight on γ′ equals
ph∑
(a,b)∈A×B γ′(a,b)us(c1,a,b)
,
Since all types of sender’s stage-game payoff is 0 under (aL,bN ), γ′′ satisfies constraint (4.2).
Since bN best replies against aL, γ′′ satisfies constraint (4.3). According to the definition of
v∗j , we have:
v∗j ≥
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ′′(a,b)us(cj ,a,b). (4.17)
According to (4.15) and (4.16), we also have:
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ′′(a,b)us(cj ,a,b) ≥ ph
ph +X(η)
( ∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ′(a,b)us(cj ,a,b) −X(η)
)
≥ ph
ph +X(η)
(
vεj −X(η)
)
. (4.18)
The expression on the RHS of (4.18) implies that for every ρ > 0, there exists η > 0 such
that once we pick ε according to η, we have:
v∗j ≥
ph
ph +X(η)
(
vεj −X(η)
)
≥ vεj − ρ.
This leads to (4.14). Inequalities (4.13) and (4.14) together imply Proposition 3.
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4.4 Tightness of Payoff Upper Bound: Equilibrium Construction
Let
vN ≡
(
− c1(1− ph),−c2(1− ph), ...,−cn(1− ph)
)
,
vL ≡
(
ph + (1− c1)(1− ph), ph + (1− c2)(1 − ph), ..., ph + (1− cn)(1− ph)
)
,
and vH ≡ (ph, ph, ..., ph), which are the sender’s stage-game payoffs from pure stage-game action
profiles (aL,bN ), (aL,bT ), and (aH ,bT ), respectively. The receiver has an incentive to play bT
against ρaL + (1− ρ)aH if and only if ρ ≤ ρ∗. For every ρ ∈ [0, ρ∗], let
v(ρ) ≡ (1− ρ)c1
ρ(1− c1) + c1 v
H +
ρc1
ρ(1− c1) + c1 v
L +
ρ(1− c1)
ρ(1− c1) + c1 v
N . (4.19)
One can verify that v(0) = vH and v(ρ∗) = (v∗1 , ..., v
∗
n). The second statement of Theorem 1 is
implied by the following proposition:
Proposition 4. For every ε > 0 and ρ ∈ [0, ρ∗), there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every
pi ∈ ∆(C) with pi1 ≥ ε and δ > δ, there exists an equilibrium in which the sender’s payoff is v(ρ).
I provide a constructive proof in Appendix A. In the remainder of this section, I explain the
ideas behind the construction in an example with two types, i.e., C ≡ {c1, c2}. The conceptual
challenge is to let a patient sender reveal his persistent private information for unbounded number
of periods while preserving his informational advantage. I also explain how to square my result
with the payoff upper bound in Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990).
Preliminaries: In the constructed equilibrium, the stage-game outcome at every on-path history
is a distribution supported on
{
(aH ,bT ), (aL,bT ), (aL,bN )
}
. The sender’s continuation value at
every on-path history is a convex combination of vH , vL, and vN , and belongs to a polytope V ∗ with
the following four vertices: vH , v∗, v ≡ q∗(ρ∗vL + (1− ρ∗)vH) + (1− q∗)vN with q∗ ∈ [0, 1] pinned
down by the condition that the first entry of the above vector equals 0, and v ≡ p∗vH +(1− p∗)vN
with
p∗ ≡ c1(1− ph)
ph + c1(1− ph)
. (4.20)
In an environment with two types, V ∗ is depicted as the yellow set in Figure 1.
State Variables & Phases: When there are two types, I keep track of two state variables:11
11When there are three or more types, one needs to keep track of two additional state variables, see Appendix A.
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1. The probability of type c1 sender in the receiver’s posterior belief, denoted by η(h
t). I call
this the sender’s reputation at ht. The initial value of η(·) is pi1.
2. The sender’s continuation value, denoted by v(ht) ∈ Rm. The initial value of v(·) is v(ρ),
namely, the target payoff. Given that v(ht) is a convex combination of vH , vN and vL, it is
equivalent to keep track of their convex weights, denoted by pH(ht), pN (ht), and pL(ht).
The equilibrium consists of three phases.
1. Play starts from an active learning phase in which the receiver plays bT and the two types of
the sender mix between aH and aL in most of the periods, with type c1 playing a
H with higher
probability compared to type c2. An important exception is when the receiver’s posterior
belief attaches probability close to 1 to the sender being type c1, in which case type c1 mixes
between aH and aL, and type c2 plays a
L for sure.12
2. When the sender’s continuation value is close to his minmax payoff, play enters a rebounding
phase in which learning temporarily stops. In this phase, the receiver plays bN and all types
of sender plays aL. Play transits from the rebounding phase back to the active learning
phase when the sender’s continuation value is high enough such that no type of the sender’s
continuation value falls below his minmax payoff when the state in the next period is l and
the sender recommends action H.
This phase is required since at some on-path histories, type c1 sender’s continuation value
approaches his minmax payoff 0 and other types’ continuation values cannot be delivered
in equilibria without learning. The rebounding phase offers a solution to such dilemma by
temporarily stops learning and prescribes the low-payoff outcome for several periods. This
increases all types of sender’s continuation values, while does not change the ratio between
the convex weight of vL and the convex weight of vH in the sender’s continuation value.
3. Play enters an absorbing phase in which learning about the sender’s type stops forever, and
the continuation play consists only of (aL,bN ) and (aH ,bT ). Play reaches this phase either
after the sender reveals his type, or after he has played aL too frequently in the active learning
phase. Despite the sender can flexibly choose whether to play aH or aL in the active learning
phase, his action choices affect the time at which play reaches the absorbing phase, and his
12Another exception is when pL(ht) is strictly between 0 and 1− δ, in which type c1 plays a
H for sure and type c2
potentially mixes between aH and aL. The details are described under Class 2 histories in Appendix A.
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continuation value after play enters the absorbing phase. For example, if he lies frequently,
then play reaches the absorbing phase sooner after which he receives a low continuation payoff.
Benefit from Persistent Private Information: I provide intuition for why the above con-
struction enables type c2 sender to extract information rent in the long run and obtain discounted
average payoff close to v∗2 (i.e., strictly above ph) when δ is arbitrarily close to 1.
I start from reviewing the argument in Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990), which explains
why the sender’s payoff cannot exceed ph when there is only one type. At every h
t where the
receiver plays H with positive probability, there exists a message m′ such that the receiver plays L
for sure after observing m′ at ht, and the sender sends m′ with strictly positive probability at ht
when the state is l. Therefore, the following strategy is the sender’s best reply against the receiver’s
equilibrium strategy, under which the sender’s payoff in each period is no more than ph:
• at every ht where the receiver plays H with positive probability, send message m′ with
probability 1 when the state is l.
Next, I explain why type c2 can obtain payoff higher than ph in the stage game when there are
two types. The above argument breaks down since the receiver may have an incentive to play bT
at histories where type c2 sender plays a
L for sure. This requires type c1 to play a
H with high
enough probability, which distinguishes his behavior from that of type c2’s. Therefore, the state
realization and the sender’s message are informative signals about the sender’s type.
Then, I explain how type c2 can reveal information and extract rent in the long run. Following
the argument in Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin (1990), if at every history, type c2 sender plays the
pure strategy that minimizes his stage-game payoff among the ones in the support of his equilibrium
strategy, then this modified strategy is type c2 sender’s equilibrium best reply, which I denote by
σ˜c2 and from which type c2 obtains his equilibrium payoff.
If type c2 plays according to σ˜c2 , then his expected stage-game payoff exceeds ph only at histories
where his equilibrium strategy prescribes aL with probability 1 while the receiver plays bT with
positive probability. His reputation changes gradually over time following the pattern of a cycle,
with outcome (aL,bT ) occurs only when the receiver’s belief attaches probability close to 1 to the
sender being type c1. This high-payoff outcome can arise in unboundedly many periods since type
c2 can rebuild his reputation in periods where he plays a
H . Such reputation rebuilding is feasible
given that type c1 mixes between a
H and aL in periods where active learning takes place. The
above observation does not contradict the martingale property of beliefs since the receiver’s belief
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is updated based on the sender’s equilibrium strategy, and therefore, her belief is not necessarily a
martingale under type c2 sender’s modified best reply σ˜c2 .
Lastly, I provide a heuristic derivation of the maximal frequency with which the sender can
extract information rent from a learning perspective, which complements the formal proofs of
Propositions 2 and 3 using occupation measures. It helps to understand why my construction
works only when ρ < ρ∗. In this heuristic derivation, I restrict attention to situations in which
the sender’s stage-game action is supported on {aH ,aL}, and the receiver’s stage-game action is
supported on {bT ,bN}. Therefore, the receiver cannot learn the sender’s type when the realized
state is h, but can potentially learn about the sender’s type when the realized state is l.
To start with, the receiver’s willingness to play bT implies that aH needs to be played with
probability at least 1−ρ∗. Since belief is a martingale, this provides an upper bound on the relative
speed of learning, which measures the magnitude with which the sender’s reputation improves after
reporting the low state honestly, and the magnitude with which his reputation deteriorates after
misstating that the state is high:
η(ht, (l, l)) − η(ht)
η(ht, (l, h)) − η(ht) ≤
ρ∗
1− ρ∗ . (4.21)
A belief updating rule that meets the above requirement is given by:
η(ht, (l, h)) − η∗ = (1− λ(1− ρ∗))(η(ht)− η∗), (4.22)
and
η(ht, (l, l)) − η∗ = min
{
1− η∗, (1 + λρ∗)(η(ht)− η∗)
}
, (4.23)
where η∗ ∈ (0, η(h0)) is a belief lower bound in the active learning phase, and λ > 0 is a parameter
that measures of speed of receiver-learning. Equations (4.22) and (4.23) pin down the probabilities
with which each type of sender plays aH and aL.
For every on-path history ht such that the sender’s reputation has not reached one, and let N
be the number of periods in which the state realization is l. If the sender plays aH and aL with
frequencies 1− ρ and ρ in these N periods, the receiver’s posterior belief attaches probability
η∗ + (η(h0)− η∗)
(
(1 + λρ∗)1−ρ(1− λ(1− ρ∗))ρ
)N
, (4.24)
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to the sender being type c1. This is no less than η(h
0) if and only if
(1 + λρ∗)1−ρ(1 − λ(1− ρ∗))ρ ≥ 1. (4.25)
Applying the Taylor’s theorem, there exists λ > 0 under which (4.25) holds if and only if ρ < ρ∗.
Therefore, if type c2 sender’s frequency of playing a
L exceeds ρ∗, then his reputation deteriorates
in the long run and extracting information rent at this rate is not sustainable. If the sender’s
frequency of playing aL is strictly below ρ∗, then there exists λ > 0 such that when λ < λ, his
reputation improves over time, which allows type c2 to sustain his information rents. This provides
a learning explanation for constraint (4.3), which requires that the relative frequency between
outcomes (aH ,bT ) and (aL,bT ) cannot fall below 1−ρ
∗
ρ∗ .
5 The Effects of Ethical-Type Sender
This section relaxes the assumption in the baseline model that c1 < 1 and examines whether the
presence of ethical-type senders, i.e., types with lying costs no less than 1, enables non-ethical types
to attain their optimal commitment payoffs.
Formally, let c ∈ C ≡ {c1, ..., cn}, with 0 ≤ cn < cn−1 < ... < c2 < c1. Let pi ∈ ∆(C) be the
receivers’ prior belief. I focus on cases in which there exists c ∈ C such that c ∈ [0, 1), i.e., there
exists a type of sender who is non-ethical and his optimal disclosure policy is stochastic.
I introduce two constrained optimization problems for every c ∈ C ∩ [1,+∞), and later provide
economic interpretations. Let
v(c) ≡ max
γ∈∆(A×B)
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ(a,b)us(c,a,b), (5.1)
subject to the constraint that there exists c′ ∈ C ∩ [0, 1) such that:
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ(a,b)us(c
′,a,b) ≥ ph + ρ∗(1− ph)(1− c′). (5.2)
Let
v(c) ≡ min
γ∈∆(A×B)
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ(a,b)us(c,a,b) (5.3)
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subject to: ∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ(a,b)us(c1,a,b) ≥ 0 (5.4)
and for every b ∈ B that the marginal distribution of γ on B attaches positive probability to,
b ∈ argmax
b′∈B
ur(γ(·|b),b′). (5.5)
Recall the definition of type cj ’s optimal commitment payoff v
∗∗
j in (3.2).
Theorem 3. Suppose pi has full support and C ∩ [0, 1) is nonempty,
1. if there exists no c ∈ C ∩ [1,+∞) such that v(c) > v(c), then there exist η > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1),
such that in every BNE when δ > δ, every type cj ∈ C ∩ [0, 1) obtains payoff no more than
v∗∗j − η.
2. if there exists c ∈ C ∩ [1,+∞) such that v(c) ≥ v(c), then for every ε > 0, there exists
δ ∈ (0, 1), such that when δ > δ, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which every type
cj ∈ C ∩ [0, 1) obtains payoff at least v∗∗j − ε.
The proof is in Appendix B (statement 1) and Appendix C (statement 2). Theorem 3 provides a
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium in which non-ethical-type sender
can attain his optimal commitment payoff. The attainability of this payoff depends only on the
existence of an ethical-type sender whose lying cost c satisfies v(c) ≥ v(c). When C ∩ [1,+∞)
is empty, the second statement of Theorem 3 applies, which is implied by Theorem 1 given that
v∗j < v
∗∗
j for every cj ∈ C ∩ [0, 1). When C ∩ [1,+∞) is nonempty, namely, at least one type of
the sender is ethical, the following predictions emerge which are different from the ones in models
without ethical types:
1. the attainability of optimal commitment payoffs depends not only on c1 but also on other
ethical types, in particular, the lowest lying cost among these ethical types;
2. an increase the value of c1 can decrease other types of sender’s highest equilibrium payoffs.
To understand these implications, I provide economic interpretations for v(c) and v(c), stated
as Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2. Let c be a typical element of C ∩ [1,+∞). Lemma 5.1 shows that
in every equilibrium where at least one type of non-ethical sender obtains his optimal commitment
payoff, v(c) is an upper bound for type c ethical sender’s equilibrium payoff.
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Lemma 5.1. For every small enough ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ > δ, in
every equilibrium in which there exists cj ∈ C ∩ [0, 1) such that type cj attains payoff more than
v∗∗j − ε, there exists c ∈ C ∩ [1,+∞) such that type c’s payoff is no more than v(c) + ε.
The proof is in Appendix B.1. This is because every ethical-type sender’s stage-game payoff is
maximized by reporting the state truthfully while the receiver’s action matches the state.13 But
some ethical type needs to lie with positive probability and suffer from payoff losses in order to
provide cover for the nonethical types so that the latter can attain their optimal commitment
payoffs. The first constrained optimization problem characterizes the minimal amount of payoff
loss type c needs to incur in order for a non-ethical type to obtain his optimal commitment payoff.
The next lemma shows that v(c) is a lower bound for type c sender’s equilibrium payoff, given
that he has the option to adopt type c1 sender’s equilibrium strategy, from which the latter’s payoff
is no less than his minmax payoff 0.
Lemma 5.2. For every ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ > δ, for every c ∈
C ∩ [1,+∞), type c’s payoff in every equilibrium is at least v(c)− ε.
The proof is in Appendix B.2. Solving for the values of v(c) and v(c), and using the fact that
ρ∗ ≡ ph1−ph , we obtain:
v(c) = ph − ρ∗(c− 1)(1 − ph) = ph(2− c), (5.6)
and
v(c) =
(c1 − c)ρ∗ph(1− ph)
ph + ρ∗c1(1− ph) =
ph(c1 − c)
1 + c1
. (5.7)
The necessary and sufficient condition in Theorem 3 translates into:
c1(c− 1) ≤ 2. (5.8)
Let c∗ ≡ min
{
C ∩ [1,+∞)
}
. Theorem 3 and the above derivations lead to the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Suppose pi has full support and neither C ∩ [0, 1) nor C ∩ [1,+∞) is empty,
1. if c1(c
∗ − 1) ≤ 2, then for every ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1), such that when δ > δ, there
exists a sequential equilibrium in which every type cj ∈ C∩ [0, 1) obtains payoff at least v∗∗j −ε.
2. if c1(c
∗ − 1) > 2, then there exist η > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), such that in every BNE when δ > δ,
every type cj ∈ C ∩ [0, 1) obtains payoff no more than v∗∗j − η.
13I am ruling out the receiver’s strategy of taking the high action with ex ante probability 1.
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Corollary 2 suggests that the attainability of non-ethical types’ optimal commitment payoffs
depends only on the highest and the lowest lying cost among the ethical types. Aside from the
knife-edge case in which 1 ∈ C, the optimal commitment payoffs are attainable if and only if the
highest cost of lying c1 is below some cutoff.
14 For example, if there is only one ethical type in the
support of receivers’ prior belief, then the optimal commitment payoffs are attainable if and only
if c = c1 ∈ [1, 2].15
Different from models without ethical types, non-ethical type sender’s highest attainable payoff
strictly decreases with the highest lying cost when the latter is large enough. In a model with at
least one ethical type (call it the original ethical type), introducing an additional ethical type who
has a high cost of lying can reduce non-ethical types’ highest equilibrium payoffs. This contrasts
to models without ethical types in which every type’s highest equilibrium payoff is non-decreasing
after introducing an additional type, no matter whether this additional type is ethical or not.
Intuitively, this is driven by a novel outside option effect, which is absent in models without
ethical types or in models with commitment types. In particular, once receivers entertain the
possibility that the sender can be a type who incurs a high lying cost, the original ethical type
enjoys weakly better outside options since he can imitate the equilibrium strategy of the highest-
cost type, from which the latter receives at least his minmax payoff. This improvement in his outside
option restricts the frequency with which the original ethical type can lie on the equilibrium path,
which in turn reduces the non-ethical types’ long-term payoff gain from reputation building and
milking, since the number of times with which he can lie and pool with some ethical type decreases.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies repeated communication games in which the sender has persistent private infor-
mation about his psychological cost of lying. I characterize every type of patient sender’s highest
equilibrium payoff as the solution of a constrained optimization problem, and provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for every type of non-ethical sender to attain his optimal commitment
payoff. My results also clarify the distinction between a strategic-type sender who faces high lying
cost, and a commitment-type sender who mechanically adopts his Bayesian disclosure policy in
every period. In addition, the possibility of being ethical and having a high-lying cost can hurt
14If 1 ∈ C, namely, there exists a type whose lying cost is exactly 1, then all types of non-ethical senders can
approximately attain their optimal commitment payoffs, irrespective of what the highest lying cost is.
15When a type of sender’s lying cost is 2, his payoff from the non-ethical sender’s optimal disclosure policy is 0
upon receiving the receiver’s trust.
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non-ethical senders due to a novel outside option effect.
A Proof of Proposition 4
For δ close enough to 1, I construct an equilibrium such that at every on-path history, the dis-
tribution over players’ stage-game action profiles are supported on
{
(aH ,bT ), (aL,bT ), (aL,bN )
}
,
and the sender’s continuation payoff is a convex combination of vH , vN and vL, belonging to a
polytope V ∗ with the following four vertices: vH , v∗, v ≡ q∗(ρ∗vL + (1− ρ∗)vH) + (1− q∗)vN with
q∗ ∈ [0, 1] pinned down by the condition that the first entry of the above vector equals 0, and
v ≡ p∗vH + (1− p∗)vN with
p∗ ≡ c1(1− ph)
ph + c1(1− ph) . (A.1)
Since c1 > cj for every j 6= 1, we know that v∗ > v∨ vH , and v∧ vH ≥ v, and the second inequality
is strict for all entries of this m-dimensional vector except for the first entry.
In what follows, I verify that the sender’s continuation payoff vector at every history belongs to
V ∗ after describing players’ equilibrium strategies and the evolution of their continuation values.
A.1 State Variables & Useful Constants
The constructed equilibrium keeps track of the following three sets of state variables:
1. The probability of type c1 sender in the receiver’s posterior belief, denoted by η(h
t). I call
this the sender’s reputation at ht.
2. The promised continuation payoff to the sender, denoted by v(ht) ∈ Rn. Given that it is a
convex combination of vH , vN and vL, it is equivalent to keep track of the convex weights of
vH , vN and vL in v(ht), which I denote by pH(ht), pN (ht), and pL(ht), respectively.
3. The lowest-cost type in the support of receivers’ posterior belief, denoted by c(ht), as well as
its probability according to the receiver’s belief at ht.
The initial values of these state variables are η(h0) = pi1, p
H(h0) = (1−ρ)c1ρ(1−c1)+c1 , p
L(h0) = ρc1ρ(1−c1)+c1 ,
pN (h0) = ρ(1−c1)ρ(1−c1)+c1 , c(h
0) = cn, and the probability of type c(h
0) is pin.
I construct some constants for future reference. First, let
δ̂ ≡ δ 1− ph
1− δph ,
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which is called the sender’s effective discount factor and is strictly smaller than δ. One can verify
that for any ph ∈ (0, 1), the effective discount factor converges to 1 as δ → 1. I will replace δ with
δ̂ when specifying the evolution of the sender’s continuation payoff vector.
Recall that pi ≡ (pi1, ..., pin) is the receiver’s prior belief about the sender’s lying cost. For every
j ≥ 3, let kj be the smallest integer k ∈ N such that:
(
1− (1− ρ∗)pi1
) (pij/k)∑j−1
τ=2 piτ + (pij/k)
≤ ρ∗ ≡ ph
1− ph . (A.2)
Let η∗ ∈ [(1− ρ∗)pi1, pi1) be large enough such that for every η ∈ [η∗, pi1], we have:
pi1 − η
pi1(1− η) ≤ minj∈{3,...,n}
{ pij/kj
pi2 + ...+ pij
}
(A.3)
The ensuing construction implies that η∗ is a uniform lower bound on the probability of type c1
that applies to all histories where active learning takes place.
For every fixed ρ ∈ (0, ρ∗), there exists a rational number n̂/l̂ ∈ (ρ, ρ∗) with n̂, l̂ ∈ N. Moreover,
there exists an integer j ∈ N such that
n̂
l̂
=
n̂j
l̂j
>
n̂j
l̂j + 1
> ρ.
Let n ≡ n̂j and l ≡ l̂j. Let
ρ˜ ≡ 1
2
(n
l
+
n
l + 1
)
, (A.4)
and
ρ̂ ≡ 1
2
(n
l
+ ρ∗
)
. (A.5)
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) to be large enough such that for every δ > δ,
δ + δ2 + ...+ δn
δ + δ2 + ...+ δl
> ρ˜ >
δl−n+1(δ + δ2 + ...+ δn)
δ + δ2 + ...+ δl+1
. (A.6)
I require δ to be large enough such that its corresponding δ̂ > δ. In the subsequent proof, I will
introduce additional requirements on δ, which are compatible given that all of them require δ to
be large enough (but strictly smaller than 1). By construction, ρ∗ > ρ̂ > nl > ρ˜ >
n
l−1 > ρ. Let
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λ > 0 to be small enough such that:
(1 + λρ∗)1−ρ̂(1 − λ(1− ρ∗))ρ̂ > 1. (A.7)
The existence of such λ > 0 is implied by the Taylor’s expansion given that ρ∗ > ρ̂. This will later
be related to the speed of receiver-learning.
A.2 Equilibrium Strategies & Continuation Values
Play consists of three phases: an active learning phase, an absorbing phase, and a rebounding
phase. I partition the set of active learning phase histories into two subsets: Class 1 histories and
Class 2 histories, depending on the magnitude of pL(ht).
Class 1 Active Learning History: Play starts from a Class 1 history of the active learning
phase. A history belongs to this class if and only if:
1. pL(ht) ≥ 1− δ̂,
2. The first entry of the following m-dimensional vector is non-negative:
pL(ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vL +
pH(ht)
δ̂
vH +
pN (ht)
δ̂
vN . (A.8)
In this phase, the receiver plays bT (i.e., trust the sender’s recommendation). The sender of types
c2 to cn play the same mixed action, and type c1 sender plays differently. All types send message
h with probability 1 if ωt = h, i.e., η(h
t, (h, h)) = η(ht). The mixing probabilities of type c1 as well
as other types when the state is l is pinned down by the following belief-updating formulas:
η(ht, (l, h)) − η∗ = (1− λ(1− ρ∗))(η(ht)− η∗), (A.9)
and
η(ht, (l, l)) − η∗ = min
{
1− η∗, (1 + λρ∗)(η(ht)− η∗)
}
, (A.10)
with
• η∗ is the constant defined in (A.3), which is the lower bound on the receiver’s belief in the
active learning phase,
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• λ > 0 is a constant that measures the speed of learning and satisfies (A.7),
• η(ht, (h, h)) is the receiver’s belief in period t+ 1 when ωt = mt = h,
• η(ht, (l, h)) is the receiver’s belief in period t+ 1 when ωt = l and mt = h,
• η(ht, (l, l)) is the receiver’s belief in period t+ 1 when ωt = mt = l.
Given that on the equilibrium path, the sender does not send message l when ωt = h, η(h
t, (h, l))
can be arbitrary. I do not specify the receiver’s belief since the sender’s continuation value at
η(ht, (h, l)) equals v, which can be implemented under any belief of the receiver’s.
According to (A.9) and (A.10) as well as the martingale property of the receiver’s beliefs, the
sender plays aH with probability at least 1− ρ∗ in every period, which implies that conditional on
observing message h, the receiver’s posterior belief attaches probability at least 1/2 to ωt = h, and
hence, has an incentive to play bT .
Next, I construct the evolution of the sender’s continuation value. If ht is such that η(ht, (l, l)) <
1, then the sender’s continuation payoff is given by:
v(ht, (h, h)) = v(ht), (A.11)
v(ht, (l, h)) =
pH(ht)
δ̂
vH +
pL(ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vL +
pN (ht)
δ̂
vN , (A.12)
v(ht, (l, l)) =
pH(ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vH +
pL(ht)
δ̂
vL +
pN (ht)
δ̂
vN , (A.13)
and v(ht, (h, l)) = v. Under the continuation values specified in (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13), each
type of sender is indifferent between sending message h and sending message l in period t when
ωt = l, and strictly prefers to send message h when ωt = h.
If ht is such that η(ht, (l, l)) = 1, then the sender’s continuation payoff is v(ht, (h, h)) = v(ht),
v(ht, (h, l)) = v,
v(ht, (l, h)) =
pH(ht)
δ̂
vH +
pL(ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vL +
pN (ht)
δ̂
vN ,
and
v(ht, (l, l)) = q(ht)vH + (1− q(ht))vN , (A.14)
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where q(ht) ∈ [0, 1] is such that the first entry of v(ht, (l, l)) equals the first entry of vector:
pH(ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vH +
pL(ht)
δ̂
vL +
pN (ht)
δ̂
vN .
Under these continuation values, type c1 sender is indifferent between sending message h and l
when ωt = l, and strictly prefers message h when ωt = h. Types c2 to cn strictly prefer to send
message h in both states.
Class 2 Active Learning History: Play reaches a Class 2 history if:
1. pL(ht) ∈ (0, 1 − δ̂),
2. The first entry of (A.8) is non-negative.
At those histories, the receiver plays bT . All types (in the support of receiver’s belief) except for
type c(ht) play aH with probability 1 while type c(ht) (potentially) mixes between aL and aH . To
specify his mixing probabilities, let
l(ht) ≡ #
{
hs
∣∣∣hs ≺ ht, hs belongs to Class 2, ωs = l, and c(hs) = c(ht)} (A.15)
be the number of histories that (1) strictly precede ht, and (2) the lowest lying cost type in the
support of the receiver’s belief is c(ht), and (3) the state realized at history hs is l.
1. If c(ht) = cj with j ≥ 3, then type c(ht) plays aL at ht with probability
1
kj − l(ht) , (A.16)
and aH with complementary probability, with kj the integer defined in (A.8).
2. If c(ht) = c2, then type c2 sender plays a
L at ht with probability
min{1, ρ
∗
1− η(ht)}, (A.17)
and aH with complementary probability.
The sender’s continuation value is given by v(ht, (h, h)) = v(ht), v(ht, (h, l)) = p∗vH + (1− p∗)vL,
v(ht, (l, h)) ≡ Q(h
t)
δ̂
vH +
δ̂ −Q(ht)
δ̂
vN , (A.18)
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where
Q(ht) ≡ pH(ht)− (1− δ̂) + p
L(ht)
ph + (1− ph)c(ht) . (A.19)
Therefore, type c(ht) sender weakly prefers to send message h when the realized state is l, while
other types of senders in the support of receiver’s belief at ht strictly prefers to send message l
when the realized state is l. The sender’s continuation value after sending message l when ωt = l
depends on whether η(ht, (l, l)) equals 1 or not, with η(ht, (l, l)) computed via Bayes Rule given
the receiver’s belief at ht and type c(ht)’s mixing probability at ht:
1. If η(ht, (l, l)) < 1, then the sender’s continuation payoff at (ht, (l, l)) is:
v(ht, (l, l)) =
pH(ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vH +
pL(ht)
δ̂
vL +
pN (ht)
δ̂
vN .
2. If η(ht, (l, l)) = 1, then the sender’s continuation payoff at (ht, (l, l)) is:
v(ht, (l, l)) = q(ht)vH + (1− q(ht))vN ,
where q(ht) ∈ [0, 1] is such that the first entry of v(ht, (l, l)) equals the first entry of payoff
vector:
pH(ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vH +
pL(ht)
δ̂
vL +
pN (ht)
δ̂
vN .
Notice that η(ht, (l, l)) = 1 can only happen when c(ht) = c2. This is because if c(h
t) < c2, then
type c2 sends message l with probability 1 when the state is l at history h
t, which implies that the
sender’s reputation η(ht, (l, l)) cannot equal 1.
Rebounding Phase: Play reaches the rebounding phase if
1. pL(ht) 6= 0,
2. The first entry of (A.8) is negative.
At those histories, the receiver plays bN , all types of sender plays aL (i.e., sending message h
regardless of the state), and therefore, the sender’s message reveals no information about his type
and the receiver’s incentive constraints are satisfied. Given the sender’s continuation value at ht,
denoted by v(ht), his continuation value following (ωt,mt) = (h, h) equals v(h
t), his continuation
value after (ωt,mt) = (h, l) equals v(h
t), his continuation value after (ωt,mt) = (l, l) equals v, and
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his continuation value after (ωt,mt) = (l, h) equals
v(ht, (l, h)) ≡ p
H(ht)
δ̂
vH +
pL(ht)
δ̂
vL +
pN (ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vN . (A.20)
Under these continuation values, every type of sender has an incentive to send message h when the
state is h. According to (A.20), we have:
v(ht) = (1− ph)
{
(1− δ)0+ δv(ht)
}
+ ph
{
− (1− δ)c + δv(ht, (l, l))
}
,
with 0 ≡ (0, ..., 0) and c ≡ (c1, ..., cn). Since v(ht) ≥ 0, we have v(ht) > (1 − δ)0 + δv(ht), and
therefore,
−(1− δ)c + δv(ht, (l, h)) > v(ht) ≥ v.
This implies that the sender has an incentive to send message h when the state is l.
Absorbing Phase: Play reaches the absorbing phase if pL(ht) = 0, i.e., the sender’s continuation
value is a convex combination of vN and vH , after which play stays in the absorbing phase forever
and learning about the sender’s type stops. By construction of the previous phases, type c1’s
continuation value when play first reaches the absorbing phase is non-negative, i.e., it is weakly
greater than his minmax payoff 0.
I construct, for any pH ≥ p∗ and under any belief of the receiver’s, an equilibrium in which
(1) learning does not happen on the equilibrium path, and (2) the sender attains payoff vector
v = pHvH + pNvN . Recall the definition of p∗ in the beginning of this appendix. If ht is such that
pH(ht)− (1− δ)
δ
≥ p
∗ + 1
2
,
then all types of senders adopt the honest strategy aH , and players’ continuation payoffs are given
by the following functions of the current period outcome:
v(ht, (h, h)) = v(ht), v(ht, (l, l)) =
pH(ht)− (1− δ)
δ
vH +
pN (ht)
δ
vN , (A.21)
and
v(ht, (l, h)) = v(ht, (h, l)) = v. (A.22)
I use δ instead of δ̂ in (A.21) since all types of senders play a pure action at such a history, so
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his equilibrium action can be perfectly monitored. When δ is large enough, every type of sender
strictly prefers to conform at those histories. If ht is such that:
pH(ht)− (1− δ)
δ
<
p∗ + 1
2
,
then all types of senders play aL, and the sender’s continuation payoff after sending message h is:
pH(ht)
δ
vH +
pN (ht)− (1− δ)
δ
vN , (A.23)
and after sending message l is p∗vH + (1 − p∗)vL. One can verify that at each of these histories,
type c1 sender weakly prefers to conform and types c2 to cm strictly prefer to conform. Moreover,
this continuation equilibrium is incentive compatible for players regardless of the receiver’s belief
about the sender’s lying costs.
A.3 Incentive Constraints & Promise Keeping Constraints
I verify players’ incentive constraints and the sender’s promise keeping conditions. The latter
requires that the continuation play delivers all types of senders their respective continuation values.
Due to the nature of incomplete information, I use a different approach compared to Abreu, Pearce
and Stacchetti (1990) by showing that as t→∞, players’ on-path play enters the absorbing phase
with probability 1. Given that in the previous subsection, I have constructed equilibrium strategies
after play reaches the absorbing phase that are (1) incentive compatible for all types of senders
and the receivers, and (2) can deliver the promised continuation values to all types of senders, the
eventual convergence to the absorbing phase implies the promise keeping condition.
I state several results which implies that first, players’ incentive constraints are satisfied at
every history, and second, the promised continuation value at each history can be delivered in
the continuation equilibrium. A outcome path in period t consists of the states and the sender’s
messages from period 0 to period t− 1, with:
o(ht) ≡
(
(ω0,m0), ..., (ωt−1,mt−1)
)
.
For every on-path history ht, o(ht) consists only of (h, h), (l, l), and (l, h). A reduced outcome
path, denoted by r(ht), is derived from o(ht) by ignoring periods in which the outcome is (h, h).
As a result, every component of r(ht) can be summarized by the sender’s message alone. Abusing
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notation, r(ht) ∈ ⋃∞k=0{h, l}k, with the nth element of r(ht) be the sender’s message when state l
occurs for the nth time. For every ht ≻ hs, let r(ht\hs) be the reduced outcome path between hs
and ht. According to the specifications of posterior beliefs and continuation values in the previous
section, for every pair of histories hs and ht with ht ≻ hs, suppose all histories between hs and ht
belong to the active learning phase, then η(ht) only depends on η(hs) and the sequence r(ht\hs).
• Let Nl(r(ht\hs)) be the number of message l in r(ht\hs).
• Let Nh(r(ht\hs)) be the number of message h in r(ht\hs).
• Let |r(ht\hs)| be the number of elements in r(ht\hs).
• Let
r(ht\hs) ≡
(
m0,m1, ...,m|r(ht\hs)|−1
)
.
For every ht ≻ hs with all histories from hs to ht belonging to Class 1, the receiver’s posterior belief
attaches the following probability to type c1 sender
η(ht) = η∗ + (η(hs)− η∗)
(
1− λ(1− ρ∗)
)Nh(r(ht\hs))(
1 + λρ∗
)Nl(r(ht\hs))
, (A.24)
and the convex weights on the sender’s continuation value are given by:
pH(ht) =
pH(hs)− (1− δ̂)
|r(ht\hs)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ1{mτ = l}
δ̂|r(h
t\hs)| ,
pL(ht) =
pL(hs)− (1− δ̂)
|r(ht\hs)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ1{mτ = h}
δ̂|r(h
t\hs)| ,
pN (ht) =
pN (hs)
δ̂|r(h
t\hs)| .
The following lemma shows that conditional play remains in Class 1 histories, the discounted
average frequency of message l divided by the discounted average frequency of message h in the
reduced outcome (i.e., counting only periods where the state realization is l) must be below some
cutoff. This provides an upper bound on the sender’s continuation value, which is directly implied
by Lemma A.1 in Pei (2019):
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Lemma A.0. For every η ∈ (η∗, 1), there exist T ∈ N and δ ∈ (0, 1), s.t. when η(hs) ≥ η and
δ̂ > δ, if ht ≡ (y0, ..., yt−1) ≻ hs and all histories between hs and ht belong to Class 1, then:
(1− δ̂)
|r(ht\hs)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ−11{mτ = l} ≤ (1− δ̂T ) + (1− δ̂)
|r(ht\hs)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ−11{mτ = h} · 1− ρ˜
ρ˜
. (A.25)
The proof is in Pei (2019). I use this result and my construction in the previous section to
establish the following four lemmas, which imply incentive compatibility and promise keeping, and
are shown in the follow-up subsections. Lemma A.1 establishes a lower bound on the receiver’s
posterior belief after observing message l in state l at any history that belongs to Class 2.
Lemma A.1. For any history ht belonging to Class 2,
• If c(ht) ≤ c3, then η(ht, (l, l)) ≥ η(h0) and η(ht, (l, h)) = 0.
• If c(ht) = c2, then η(ht, (l, l)) = min{1, η(h
t)
1−ρ∗ } and η(ht, (l, h)) = 0.
The next lemma establishes a uniform upper bound on the number histories that belong to
Class 2 and the realized state in the previous period is l, which applies along every on-path play.
Lemma A.2. There exist δ ∈ (0, 1) and M ∈ N, such that when δ > δ and along every on-path
play, the number of histories that belong to Class 2 while the previous period state is l is ≤M .
Lemma A.2 implies that for every on-path history ht, the number of periods that belong to
Class 2 in the reduced outcome r(ht) is no more than M . Lemma A.3 establishes a uniform lower
bound on pH(ht) for all histories belonging to the active learning phase (Class 1 and Class 2).
Lemma A.3. There exist δ ∈ (0, 1) and Q > 0, such that when δ > δ, we have pH(ht) ≥ Q for
all ht belonging to the active learning phase.
Lemma A.3 also implies a lower bound on pH(ht) if ht is the first history that reaches the
absorbing phase, i.e., ht is such that pL(ht) = 0 and pL(hs) > 0 for all hs ≺ ht.
Lemma A.4. There exist δ ∈ (0, 1) and M ∈ N, such that when δ > δ and along every on-path
play, the number of histories that belong to the rebounding phase is at most M .
A.4 Proof of Lemma A.1
Case 1: Consider the case in which c(ht) ≤ c3. First, suppose η(ht) ≥ η(h0), then the conclusion
of Lemma A.1 follows since η(ht, (l, l)) > η(ht) ≥ η(h0). Second, suppose η(ht) < η(h0), then given
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the value of l(ht) and the lowest-cost type at ht being cj , the posterior probability of type c1 is
bounded from below by:
η(ht)
η(ht) + (1− η(ht))
pi2 + ...+ pij−1 +
kj−l(ht)−1
kj
pij
pi2 + ...+ pij−1 +
kj−l(ht)
kj
pij
≥ η(h
t)
η(ht) + (1− η(ht))
pi2 + ...+ pij−1 +
kj−1
kj
pij
pi2 + ...+ pij−1 + pij
Let
X ≡ 1−
pi2 + ...+ pij−1 +
kj−1
kj
pij
pi2 + ...+ pij−1 + pij
=
pij
kj(pi2 + ...+ pij−1 + pij)
.
The lower bound on posterior belief η(h
t)
η(ht)+(1−η(ht))(1−X) is greater than pi1 if and only if:
X ≥ 1− (1− pi1)η(h
t)
pi1(1− η(ht)) =
pi1 − η(ht)
pi1(1− η(ht)) .
Given that η(ht) ≥ η∗ at every history ht that belongs to Class 2, the above inequality is implied
by (A.3).
Case 2: Consider the case in which c(ht) = c2. If η(h
t) ≥ 1 − ρ∗, then type c2 plays aL with
probability min{1, ρ∗1−η(ht)} = 1, which implies that η(ht, (l, l)) = 1. If η(ht) < 1 − ρ∗, then
type c2 lies in state l with probability min{1, ρ
∗
1−η(ht)} = ρ
∗
1−η(ht) , which implies that η(h
t, (l, l)) =
η(ht)/(1 − ρ∗) ≥ (1 − ρ∗)η(h0)/(1 − ρ∗) = η(h0).
A.5 Proof of Lemma A.2
Step 1: If ht belongs to Class 2 and c(ht) = cj ≤ c3, then type c(ht) sends message h in state l
with probability 1 when l(ht) = kj − 1, after which play reaches the absorbing phase. Therefore,
along every path of play, there are at most kj Class 2 histories satisfying c(h
t) = cj and the state
in the previous period (i.e. period t− 1) is l. This further implies that there are at most
K ≡ k3 + ...+ kn
Class 2 histories that has c(ht) ≤ c3 and the previous period state being l.
Step 2: Consider the number of Class 2 histories such that (1) c(ht) = c2, and (2) the state in the
previous period is l. Let N ≡ ⌈ 11−γ ⌉, and recall the integer constant T in Lemma A.1. In addition
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to the requirements on δ specified before, I need require δ to be large enough such that δ̂ satisfies
δ̂T+1(1 + δ̂ + ...+ δ̂N ) > N and 2δ̂T+N+2 > 1. (A.26)
First, I show that after the sender sends message l when the state is l at ht, it takes at most T +N
such periods for play to reach a history that belongs to either to the absorbing phase or to another
Class 2 history. According to the continuation value at (ht, (l, l)), we have:
pL(ht, (l, l)) =
pL(ht)
δ̂
<
1− δ̂
δ̂
. (A.27)
The last inequality comes from ht belonging to Class 2, so that pL(ht) < 1 − δ̂ by definition.
According to Lemma A.1, for every Class 1 history hs such that hs ≻ (ht, (l, l)) ≡ ht+1 and all
histories between (ht, (l, l)) and hs belong to Class 1, we have:
(1− δ̂)
|r(hs\ht+1)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ−11{mτ = l} ≤ (1− δ̂T ) + (1− δ̂)
|r(hs\ht+1)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ−11{mτ = h} · 1− ρ˜
ρ˜
. (A.28)
Moreover, (A.27) and the requirement that all histories between (ht, (l, l)) and hs belong to Class
1 imply that
(1− δ̂)
|r(hs\ht+1)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ−11{mτ = h} < 1− δ̂
δ̂
. (A.29)
Given that only (aL,bT ) and (aH ,bT ) occur at active learning phase histories (Class 1 and 2):
1− δ̂|r(hs\ht+1)|−1 = (1 − δ̂)
|r(hs\ht+1)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ−11{mτ = h}+ (1− δ̂)
|r(hs\ht+1)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ−11{mτ = l}
≤ (1− δ̂T ) + 1− δ̂
δ̂
+
1− δ̂
δ̂
1− ρ˜
ρ˜
≤ (1− δ̂T ) + 1− δ̂
δ̂ρ˜
≤ (1− δ̂T ) + 1− δ̂
δ̂ρ
(A.30)
Next, I show that |r(hs\ht+1)| ≤ T +N + 1. Suppose toward a contradiction that |r(hs\ht+1)| ≥
T +N + 2, then
(1− δ̂T ) + 1− δ̂
δ̂
N ≥ (1− δ̂T ) + 1− δ̂
δ̂ρ
≥ 1− δ̂|r(hs\ht+1)|−1 ≥ 1− δ̂T+N+1,
which yields:
1− δ̂
δ̂
N ≥ δ̂T (1− δ̂N+1).
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Dividing both sides by 1−δ̂
δ̂
, we have:
N ≥ δ̂T+1(1 + δ̂ + ...+ δ̂N ),
which contradicts the first inequality of (A.26).
Second, I focus on history hs that has the following two features:
1. hs belongs to Class 2, and the state in period s− 1 is l,
2. hs  (ht, (l, l)) and all histories between (ht, (l, l)) and hs, excluding hs, belong to Class 1.
I show that there exists at most one period from (ht, (l, l)) to hs such that the stage-game outcome
is such that the sender sends message h while the state is l. Suppose toward a contradiction that
there exist two or more such periods, then
(1− δ̂)
|r(hs\ht+1)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ−11{mτ = h} ≥ 2(1− δ̂)δ̂T+N+1.
The last inequality comes from the previous conclusion that |r(hs\ht+1)| ≤ T +N + 1. According
to (A.29),
2(1− δ̂)δ̂T+N+1 < (1− δ̂)
|r(hs\ht+1)|∑
τ=1
δ̂τ−11{mτ = h} < 1− δ̂
δ̂
. (A.31)
The above inequality contradicts the second inequality of (A.26) that 2δ̂T+N+2 > 1.
Let ht be the first time play reaches a history that belongs to Class 2 with c(ht) = c2. According
to Lemma A.1, η(ht, (l, l)) ≥ η∗1−ρ∗ ≥ η(h0) = pi1. Let hs be the next history that belongs to Class 2
with ωs−1 = l. Since we have shown that the receiver takes the wrong action at most once between
(ht, (l, l)) and hs, we know that
η(hs, (l, l) = min{1, η(h
s)
1− ρ∗ } ≥ min{1,
η(ht, (l, l))
1− ρ∗ (1− λ(1− ρ
∗))}
Therefore, conditional on (hs, (l, l)) is not an absorbing phase history, the receiver’s belief at
(hs, (l, l)) attaches probability at least:
η(hs, (l, l)) ≥ η(ht, (l, l))1 − λ(1− ρ
∗)
1− ρ∗ ≥ η(h
t, (l, l))
√
1
1− ρ∗ (A.32)
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to type c1, where the last inequality comes from λ ∈ (0, 1−
√
1−ρ∗
1−ρ∗ ). Let
M̂ ≡ log(1/pi1)
log
√
1
1−ρ∗
+ 1.
Since η(ht, (l, l)) ≥ pi1 for the first Class 2 history ht satisfying c(ht) = c2, there can be at most
M̂ Class 2 histories with c2 being the highest-cost type along every path of play. This is because
otherwise, the receiver’s posterior belief attaches probability greater than
pi1
( 1√
1− ρ∗
)M̂
> 1
at the (M̂ + 1)th such history, which leads to a contradiction. Summarizing the conclusions of the
two parts, we know that along every path of equilibrium play, there exist at most M ≡ K + M̂
histories that belong to Class 2 and the state in the previous period is l.
A.6 Proof of Lemma A.3
Consider any given Class 2 history ht such that no predecessor of ht belongs to Class 2, in another
word, all predecessors of ht belong to Class 1 or the rebounding phase. Therefore, pH(ht−1) ≥ Y ,
which implies that pH(ht) ≥ Y − (1− δ̂). As a result
Q(ht) = pH(ht)− 1− δ̂ − p
L(ht)
c(ht)
≥ Y − (1− δ̂) > 0.
If play remains at the active learning phase (Class 1 or 2) after ht, then player 1 must be sending
message l when the state is l at ht, after which
pH(ht, (l, l)) ≥ pH(ht)− (1− δ̂) ≥ Y − 2(1− δ̂) and pL(ht, (l, l)) ≤ 1− δ̂
δ̂
.
According to Lemma A.1, η(ht, (l, l)) ≥ η(h0) = pi1. One can then apply Lemma A.0 again, which
implies that at every Class 1 history hs such that only one predecessor of hs (1) belongs to Class
2 and (2) ωs−1 = l, we have:
pH(hs) ≥ Z ≡ Y − 2(1− δ̂)− 1− δ̂
δ̂
1− ρ˜
ρ˜
− (1− δ̂T ).
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When δ̂ is large enough, Z ≥ Y/2. Therefore, for every Class 2 history hs such that there is only
one strict predecessor history belongs to Class 2,
Q(hs) = pH(hs)− 1− δ̂ − p
L(hs)
c(hs)
≥ Z − (1− δ̂) > 0.
Iterative this process. Since
1. the number of Class 2 histories with the state in the previous period being l is bounded from
above by M along every path of play,
2. for every Class 2 history ht, pL(ht, (l, l)) = 1−δ̂
δ̂
and η(ht, (l, l)) ≥ η(h0),
there exist δ ∈ (0, 1) and Q > 0 such that when δ > δ, pH(ht) ≥ Q for every Class 1 history ht.
A.7 Proof of Lemma A.4
I construct a constant K ∈ N that is independent of the discount factor δ such that once play
enters the rebounding phase, it will go back to the active learning phase after at most K periods
with the realized state ω being l. First, type c1’s continuation value in the rebounding phase is
at least 0. Second, play goes back to the active learning phase whenever his continuation value is
above (1 − δ̂)(ph + (1 − c1)(1 − ph)). After K periods in the rebounding phase with the realized
state being l, type c1’s continuation value is at least:
1− δ̂K
δ̂K
c(1− ph), (A.33)
which is more than (1− δ̂)(ph + (1− c1)(1− ph)) if
K ≥
⌈ph + (1− c1)ph
c1(1− ph)2
⌉
. (A.34)
Lemma A.4 is obtained by setting δ to be close enough to 1 such that the corresponding δ̂K satisfies
the requirement for δ in Lemma A.0.
B Proof of Theorem 3: Statement 1
I show Lemma 5.1 in section B.1, and show Lemma 5.2 in section B.2. The two lemmas together
imply the first statement of Theorem 3.
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B.1 Proof of Lemma 5.1
Step 1: Given that v(c) = ph(2− c), the optimal value is attained by a distribution that attaches
probability ρ∗ to action profile (aL,bT ) and probability 1− ρ∗ to action profile (aH ,bT ). I denote
this distribution by γ∗ ∈ ∆(A×B), under which type cj ’s expected stage-game payoff is ph(2− cj)
for every cj ∈ C ∩ [0, 1). Therefore, v(c) is also the value of the following constrained optimization
problem, which shares the same objective function but faces a larger set of constraints:
v(c) = max
γ∈∆(A×B)
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ(a,b)us(c,a,b)
subject to the constraint that for every cj ∈ C ∩ [0, 1),
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γ(a,b)us(cj ,a,b) ≥ ph(2− cj).
Step 2: Fix the value of δ. Let σcj : H → ∆(A) be type cj sender’s equilibrium strategy, and let
σr : H → ∆(B) be the receiver’s equilibrium strategy. Let γc ∈ ∆(A×B) be defined as:
γc(a,b) ≡ E(σc,σr)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{(at,bt) = (a,b)}
]
, for every (a,b) ∈ A×B.
Let Σcj be the set of pure strategies in the support of σcj , with σ̂cj : H → A a typical element. Let
d(c, cj) ≡
∑
(a,b)∈A×B
γc(a,b)us(c,a,b) − sup
σ̂cj∈Σcj
E
(σ̂cj ,σ2)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtus(c,a,b)
]
. (B.1)
Let cj ≡ max
{
C ∩ [0, 1)
}
. I derive an upper bound for
η(cj) ≡ min
c∈C∩[1,+∞)
d(c, cj). (B.2)
For every c ∈ C ∩ [1,+∞) and every pure strategy σ̂cj in the support of σcj , σ̂cj is not an η(cj)-best
reply against σr for type c sender, which implies that for all on-path histories after period T ∈ N,
type cj sender is separated from all types who have strictly higher lying costs, with T the largest
integer satisfying:
(1 + c1)δ
T ≥ η(cj), (B.3)
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where 1 + c1 is the largest difference in stage-game payoff for any type of sender. According to
Proposition 1, type cj ’s continuation value after period T is at most ph. Given that his equilibrium
payoff is at least v∗∗j − ε, we have:
E
(σcj ,σ2)
[ T∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(cj ,a,b)
]
+ δT ph ≥ v∗∗j − ε,
or equivalently,
E
(σcj ,σ2)
[ T∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(cj ,a,b)
]
≥ v∗∗j − ε− δT ph. (B.4)
According to Gossner (2011), there exists S ∈ N that depends only on pi(cj) such that:
E
(σcj ,σ2)
[ T∑
t=0
(1− δ)δtu1(cj ,a,b)
]
≤ (1− δT )v∗∗j + (1 − δS)(1− v∗∗j ) (B.5)
This together with (B.4) implies that:
(1− δT )v∗∗j + (1− δS)(1 − v∗∗j ) ≥ v∗∗j − ε− δT ph,
or equivalently,
δT ≤ ε+ (1− δ
S)(1− v∗∗j )
v∗∗j − ph
. (B.6)
This together with (B.3) implies the following upper bound on η(cj):
η(cj) ≤ 1 + c1
v∗∗j − ph
(
ε+ (1− δS)(1− v∗∗j )
)
,
which vanishes to 0 as ε→ 0 and δ → 1.
Step 3: Step 1 and Step 2 imply that in every equilibrium in which some non-ethical type cj
attains payoff more than v∗∗j −ε, there exists an ethical type c and a pure strategy in the support of
σcj such that this pure strategy is type c sender’s η(cj)-best reply, with η(cj) vanishes as ε→ 0 and
δ → 1. Let γ ∈ ∆(A × B) be the occupation measure induced by this pure strategy. Constraint
(5.2) is necessary given that type cj obtains his equilibrium payoff from this pure strategy which is
greater than v∗∗j − ε, and the definition of v(c) in (5.1) suggests that type c cannot obtain payoff
strictly more than v(c) + η(cj) in equilibrium. This establishes Lemma 5.1.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Recall that γ1 ∈ ∆(A×B) is defined as:
γ1(a,b) ≡ E(σc1 ,σr)
[ ∞∑
t=0
(1− δ)δt1{(at,bt) = (a,b)}
]
, for every (a,b) ∈ A×B.
Propositions 2 and 3 apply to settings with ethical types and therefore, γ1 satisfies constraint (5.5)
in the δ → 1 limit. For type c1, he can guarantee stage-game payoff 0 by telling the truth in both
states, and therefore, γ1 satisfies constraint (5.4). Therefore, v(c) is type c’s lowest possible payoff
by imitating the equilibrium strategy of type c1. Since type c’s equilibrium payoff is weakly higher,
his equilibrium payoff is no less than v(c).
C Proof of Theorem 3: Statement 2
Let c∗ ≡ min{C ∩ [1,+∞)}. Let C be the set of ethical types with lying costs strictly greater than
c∗, which can be empty. Let C ≡ C ∩ [0, 1). Recall the definitions of vH , vL, and vN . The second
statement of Theorem 3 is implied by Proposition 5:
Proposition 5. Suppose c1(c
∗ − 1) ≤ 2. For every ε > 0 and ρ ∈ [0, ρ∗), there exists δ ∈ (0, 1)
such that for every δ > δ and pi with pi(c∗) ≥ ε, there exists a sequential equilibrium in which
• type cj attains payoff ρvLj + (1− ρ)vHj for every cj ∈ C ∪ {c∗}.
The proof consists of two steps. Let us start from considering an auxiliary game in which all
types in C occur with probability 0. Using a similar construction as that in Appendix A, one can
obtain an equilibrium that attains payoff vector ρvL + (1 − ρ)vH for all types except for the ones
in C. I omit this construction to avoid repetition.
Let σc be the equilibrium strategy of type c ∈ C\C and let σr be the receiver’s equilibrium
strategy. Let Hc be the set of histories that occur with positive probability under (σc, σr). Let H∗
be the set of histories that
1. occur with positive probability under (σc∗ , σr)
2. the sender has lied at least once before the receivers’ posterior belief ruling out the possibility
of all types in C.
Let H∗∗ ≡
{⋃
c∈CHc
}⋃H∗.
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Next, I specify the equilibrium strategies of types in C. I also modify σr and {σc}c∈C\C at histories
that do not belong to H∗∗. Every type in C plays aH with probability 1 when the receiver’s posterior
belief attaches positive probability to types in C. Upon reaching ht which is the first history such
that the receivers’ posterior belief rules out all types in C, then for every type c ∈ C ∪ {c∗},
• if c1(c− 1) ≤ 2, then type c sends message h at ht regardless of ωt,
• if c1(c− 1) > 2, then type c sends message l at ht regardless of ωt,
• the receiver plays action L at ht regardless of the sender’s message.
At history ht+1 ≻ ht, if message h is sent in period t, then the continuation equilibrium consists only
of outcomes (aH ,bT ) and (aL,bN ), with the discounted average frequency of outcome (aH ,bT )
equals ρ˜(ht), which can be computed via:
vc∗(h
t) = −(1− δ)(1 − ph)c∗ + δ
(
ρ˜(ht)ph − (1− ρ˜(ht))(1− ph)c∗
)
, (C.1)
where vc∗(h
t) is type c∗ sender’s continuation payoff at ht.
At history ht+1 ≻ ht, if message l is sent in period t, then the continuation equilibrium enters
a punishment phase which is constructed in Appendix C.1 according to the proof of Proposition 6.
This continuation equilibrium delivers payoff approximately v(c) to type c.
The receivers’ incentives at every history in H∗∗ remain intact since types in C occur with zero
probability at those histories. Similarly, at histories where the sender has never lied before, and
type c∗ and types in C coexist, all types in C play aH with probability 1, which strengthens the
receivers’ incentives to play bT . For every c ∈ C, type c sender’s incentive to play aH at the
active learning phase histories follows from a supermodularity argument, in particular, among all
pure strategies in the support of σc∗, playing a
H at the active learning phase history minimizes
the discounted average frequency of lying. Given type c∗ sender’s indifference between these pure
strategies, type c sender strictly prefers pure strategies that prescribe aH at those histories.
C.1 Constructing Punishment Phase Strategy
Recall the definitions of vN and vH in section 4. Let vO ≡ (0, ..., 0) ∈ Rn be the sender’s payoff
from action profile (aH ,bN ). For every ρ′ ∈ [ρ∗, 1], let
w(ρ′) ≡ ρ
′(1− ph)c1
ph + ρ′(1− ph)c1 v
H +
(1− ρ′)ph
ph + ρ′(1− ph)c1 v
O +
ρ′ph
ph + ρ′(1− ph)c1 v
N ∈ Rn. (C.2)
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One can verify that the first entry of w(·) equals 0, and the other entries are strictly increasing in
ρ. According to (5.7),
w(ρ∗) =
(
v(c1), ..., v(cn)
)
. (C.3)
Proposition 6. Suppose c1(c
∗− 1) ≤ 2. For every ε > 0 and ρ′ ∈ (ρ∗, 1], there exists δ ∈ (0, 1)
such that for every pi ∈ ∆(C) with pin ≥ ε and δ > δ, there exists an equilibrium in which the
sender’s payoff is w(ρ′).
To understand how Proposition 6 completes the proof, notice that
• vi(ρ∗) ≥ wi(ρ∗) for every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that c1(ci − 1) ∈ [0, 2].
• vi(ρ∗) < wi(ρ∗) for every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} such that c1(ci − 1) > 2.
For every i such that ci > 1, wi(ρ
′) is strictly increasing in ρ′ and vi(ρ) is strictly decreasing in ρ,
with both functions being continuous. This suggests that for every ρ ∈ [0, ρ∗), suppose the sender
attains payoff v(ρ) in the auxiliary game, then there exists ρ′ ∈ (ρ∗, 1] such that
• wi(ρ′) < vi(ρ) for every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} with c1(ci − 1) ∈ [0, 2].
When the chosen ρ and ρ′ in the previous step are both close enough to ρ∗,
• wk(ρ′) > vk(ρ) for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} with c1(ck − 1) > 2.
Provided that δ is close enough to 1,
• every type with v(ci) ≥ v(ci), i.e., c1(ci − 1) ∈ [0, 2] strictly prefers to follow the equilibrium
strategy of type c∗
• every type with v(ci) < v(ci) strictly prefers to play aH in the active learning phase and
strictly prefers to send message l at the first history where the sender has never lied before
and the receivers have ruled out types in C.
Proof of Proposition 6: I keep track of the following state variables:
1. The probability of type cn sender in the receiver’s posterior belief, denoted by ζ(h
t). I call
this the sender’s reputation at ht.
2. The promised continuation value to the sender, denoted by v(ht) ∈ Rn. Given that it is a
convex combination of vH , vN and vO, it is equivalent to keep track of the convex weights of
vH , vN and vO in v(ht), which I denote by pH(ht), pN (ht), and pO(ht), respectively.
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3. The highest-cost type in the support of receivers’ posterior belief, denoted by c(ht), as well
as its probability according to the receiver’s belief at ht.
The initial values of these state variables are ζ(h0) = pin, p
H(h0) = ρ
′(1−ph)c1
ph+ρ′(1−ph)c1 , p
O(h0) =
(1−ρ′)ph
ph+ρ(1−ph)c1 , p
N (h0) = ρ
′ph
ph+ρ′(1−ph)c1 , c(h
0) = c1, and the probability of type c(h
0) is pi1. Recall the
definition of the sender’s effective discount factor:
δ̂ ≡ δ 1− ph
1− δph .
Let ζ∗ ∈ (0, pin) and λ > 0 be constants, defined similarly as the proof of Proposition 4. I partition
the set of on-path histories into three subsets, depending on the value of pO(ht).
• Class 1 histories: pO(ht) ≥ 1− δ̂,
• Class 2 histories: pO(ht) ∈ (0, 1 − δ̂),
• Class 3 histories: pO(ht) = 0.
Class 1 Histories: For every ht such that pO(ht) ≥ 1− δ̂,
• The receiver plays bN .
• All types of sender only play aH and aL with positive probability. The sender of types c1 to
cn−1 play the same action, and type cn plays differently, with probabilities pinned down by:
ζ(ht, (l, h)) − ζ∗ = min{(1 + λ(1− ρ∗))(ζ(ht)− ζ∗), 1− ζ∗}, (C.4)
ζ(ht, (l, l)) − ζ∗ = (1− λρ∗)(ζ(ht)− ζ∗), (C.5)
and ζ(ht, (h, h)) = ζ(ht, (h, l)) = ζ(ht).
One can verify that according to the receiver’s belief, aL is played with probability at least ρ∗, and
therefore, she has an incentive to play bN . The sender’s continuation value is defined recursively.
In particular, v(ht, (h, h)) = v(ht, (h, l)) = v(ht),
v(ht, (l, l)) =
pH(ht)
δ̂
vH +
pN (ht)
δ̂
vN +
pO(ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vO, (C.6)
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and if ζ(ht, (l, h)) < 1, then
v(ht, (l, h)) =
pH(ht)
δ̂
vH +
pN (ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vN +
pO(ht)
δ̂
vO; (C.7)
if ζ(ht, (l, h)) = 1, then
v(ht, (l, h)) = q(ht)vH + (1− q(ht))vN , (C.8)
where q(ht) is pinned down by:
q(ht)ph − (1− q(ht))cn(1− ph) = p
H(ht)
δ̂
ph − p
N (ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
cn(1− ph). (C.9)
Class 2 Histories: For every ht such that pO(ht) ∈ (0, 1− δ̂), the receiver plays bN . All types of
sender in the support of receiver’s belief at ht plays aL except for type c(ht), who mixes between
aH and aL. To specify type c(ht)’s mixing probabilities, let
l(ht) ≡ #
{
hs
∣∣∣hs ≺ ht, hs belongs to Class 2, ωs = l, and c(hs) = c(ht)} (C.10)
be the number of histories that (1) strictly precede ht, and (2) the highest lying cost type in the
support of the receiver’s belief is c(ht), and (3) the state realized at history hs is l.
1. If c(ht) = cj with j ≤ n− 2, then type c(ht) plays aH at ht with probability
1
kj − l(ht) (C.11)
and aL with complementary probability, with kj being the smallest integer k ∈ N such that:
pij/k
pij/k + pij+1 + ...+ pin
≤ 1− ρ∗. (C.12)
2. If c(ht) = cn−1, then type cn−1 sender plays aH at ht with probability
min{1, 1− ρ
∗
1− ζ(ht)}, (C.13)
and aL with complementary probability.
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The sender’s continuation value is given by v(ht, (h, h)) = v(ht), v(ht, (h, l)) = v(ht),
v(ht, (l, l)) ≡ Q(ht)vH + (1−Q(ht))vN , (C.14)
where Q(ht) is pinned down by the following equation:
pH(ht)
δ̂
ph − p
N (ht)
δ̂
c(ht)(1− ph) = Q(ht)ph − (1−Q(ht))c(ht)(1 − ph). (C.15)
Therefore, type c(ht) sender weakly prefers to send message l when the realized state is l, while
other types of senders in the support of receiver’s belief at ht strictly prefers to send message h
when the realized state is l. The sender’s continuation value after sending message h when ωt = l
depends on whether ζ(ht, (l, h)) equals 1 or not, with ζ(ht, (l, l)) computed via Bayes Rule given
the receiver’s belief at ht and type c(ht)’s mixing probability at ht:
1. If ζ(ht, (l, h)) < 1, then the sender’s continuation payoff at (ht, (l, h)) is:
v(ht, (l, h)) =
pH(ht)
δ̂
vH +
pO(ht)
δ̂
vO +
pN(ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
vN .
2. If ζ(ht, (l, h)) = 1, then the sender’s continuation payoff at (ht, (l, h)) is:
v(ht, (l, h)) = q(ht)vH + (1− q(ht))vN ,
where q(ht) is pinned down by:
q(ht)ph − (1− q(ht))cn(1− ph) = p
H(ht)
δ̂
ph − p
N (ht)− (1− δ̂)
δ̂
cn(1− ph).
Class 3 Histories: For every ht such that pO(ht) = 0, players’ strategies are the same as in the
absorbing phase in the proof of Proposition 4. Namely, learning stops on the equilibrium path, all
types of the sender in the support of receiver’s belief plays the same action, the continuation play
on the equilibrium path consists only of outcomes (aH ,bT ) and (aL,bN ). Moreover, all types in
the support of receiver’s belief receives payoff at least zero. Such a construction is presented in
Appendix A, which I omit to avoid repetition.
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Promise Keeping Constraint: Verifying the promise keeping constraint uses the same argu-
ment as the proof of Theorem 1 in Pei (2019). In particular, recall the definitions of reduced outcome
path in Appendix A. The formulas for posterior beliefs in (C.4) and (C.5) suggests a result similar
to Lemma A.1 in Pei (2019) that along every reduced outcome path, for example from h0 to ht,
if the discounted average frequency of message h divided by the discounted average frequency of
message l exceeds ρ
∗
1−ρ∗ , then play will reach a Class 2 or Class 3 history before play reaching h
t.
Using this lemma and the sender’s strategy at Class 2 histories, one can establish that along every
reduced outcome path, the number of periods in which play stays at Class 2 histories (while the
realized state is l) is uniformly bounded from above. As t→∞, play reaches a Class 3 history with
probability 1 and the continuation payoff at those histories can be delivered via an equilibrium in
which learning about the sender’s lying cost does not happen on the equilibrium path.
D Consequentialism View on Lying
My baseline model embodies the view that the sender suffers a psychological cost of lying regardless
of the harm it causes on the receiver. I adopt a different view in this section, in which the sender
suffers from the lying costs if and only if he is trusted by the receiver and that his lie has caused
negative payoff consequences to the receiver. Formally, let β : M → ∆(A) be the sender’s belief
about receiver’s reaction to his messages. The sender’s stage-game lying cost is:
c · 1{m 6= ω} ·
(
max
m′∈M
ur(ω,β(m
′))− ur(ω,β(m))
)
. (D.1)
Players’ stage-game payoffs under the four pure action profiles defined in section 3 are given by the
following matrix:
− bT bN
aH ph, ph 0, 0
aL ph + (1 − c)(1 − ph), 2ph − 1 0, 0
For every j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, let
v†j ≡ ph
2− cj
2− c1 . (D.2)
Note that v†1 = ph = v
∗
1, v
∗
j > v
†
j > ph for every j ≥ 2. Let v† ≡ (v†1, ..., v†n). Player 1’s highest
equilibrium payoff is characterized in the following theorem:
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Payoff of Type c1
Payoff of Type c2
(aH ,bT )
(aL,bT )
Figure 2: Intersection between the two red lines is the sender’s highest equilibrium payoff under
consequentialism lying cost.
Theorem 1’. There is no BNE such that type c1 attains payoff strictly more than v
†
1. For every
ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that when δ > δ:
1. There is no BNE such that type cj attains payoff more than v
†
j + ε for some j ∈ {2, 3, ..., n}.
2. There exists a sequential equilibrium in which the sender attains payoff within ε of v†.
The highest payoff vector (v†1, ..., v
†
n) is depicted in Figure 2. The proof of the necessity part is
similar to that of Propositions 1, 2 and 3, which I omit to avoid repetition. Since players’ stage-
game payoffs are monotone-supermodular, the sufficiency part of the proof is similar to the proof of
Theorem 1 in Pei (2019), with the exception that δ needs to be replaced by a strictly lower number:
δ̂ ≡ δ 1− ph
1− δph
, (D.3)
and the receiver’s belief as well as the sender’s continuation value change in the active learning phase
only when the realized state is l but not when the realized state is h. My result on the sender’s
equilibrium behavior in equilibria that are approximately optimal for the sender also generalizes,
which is stated as Theorem 2’.
Theorem 2’. Suppose n ≥ 2. For every small enough ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
when δ > δ, for every equilibrium in which the sender attains payoff within ε of v†, no type of the
sender plays aH and aL with positive probability at all on-path histories.
Proof of Theorem 2’: Suppose toward a contradiction that in some BNE σ that attains payoff
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within ε of v†, and there exists a type cj that has a completely mixed best reply against σr.
Therefore, playing aH at every on-path history and playing aL at every on-path history are both
his best replies against σr. Theorem 1 in Liu and Pei (2020) implies that:
• For every i < j, type ci plays aH with probability 1 at every on-path history.16
I consider two cases separately. First, if j ≥ 2, then type c1 plays aH with probability 1 at every
on-path history. For type c2, he fully separates from type c1 the first time he sends message h
when the state is l, after which he is the type that has the highest lying cost and his continuation
payoff is no more than ph. As a result, his payoff in period 0 is no more than (1− δ) + δph, which
is strictly lower than v†2 as δ → 1. This leads to a contradiction.
Second, if j = 1, then type c1 finds it optimal to play a
H in every period, and is also optimal
to play aL in every period. Since the sender’s equilibrium payoff is within ε of v†, type c1’s payoff
is at least v∗1 − ε by playing aL in every period, and type c2’s payoff from doing so is no more
than v∗2 + ε. Since ph < 1/2, the receiver’s stage-game action of playing H following every message
is strictly suboptimal, and cannot be played at any on-path history. Among the remaining three
stage-game actions of the receiver’s, the sender’s stage-game payoff is 1− (1− ph)c under (aL,bT ),
0 under (aL,bN ). Let QL be the occupation measure of outcome (a
L,bT ) when the sender plays
aL in every period and the receiver plays according to σr. Type c1’s payoff by playing a
L in every
period equals:
QL
(
1− (1− ph)c1
)
,
which is no less than ph − ε since playing aL in every period is his equilibrium best reply, and his
equilibrium payoff is at least ph − ε. This gives:
QL ≥ ph − ε
1− (1− ph)c1
.
By playing aL in every period, type c2’s payoff is:
QL
(
1− (1− ph)c2
)
.
The inequality on QL leads to a lower bound on the above expression, which is (ph − ε)1−(1−ph)c21−(1−ph)c1 .
Given that ph < 1/2, this is strictly greater than v
†
2+ε when ε is small enough. This contradicts the
16Different from the binary action game studied in Pei (2019), it is not true that for every k < j, type ck plays a
L
with probability 1 at every on-path history. This is because the sender has other stage-game actions, such as lying
in every state, in which case he suffers strictly higher cost of lying compared to aL.
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conclusion of Theorem 1’ that type c2’s equilibrium payoff when δ is large enough cannot exceed
v†2 + ε.
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